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- [D]own here they see things a little differently. People down
here feel some things are worth killing for.
- Where does it come from; all of this hatred?
- You know, when I was a little boy, there was an old Negro
farmer, lived down the road from us, name of Monroe. He
was, I guess he was just a little luckier than my daddy was.
He bought himself a mule. That was a big deal 'round that
town. Now my daddy hated that mule, 'cause his friends was
always kiddin' him about there was Monroe out plowing with
his new mule, and Monroe was goin' to rent another field now
that he had a mule. One mornin' that mule jus' show'd up
dead-they'd poisoned the water. And after that there was
never any mention 'bout that mule 'round my daddy. Jus'
never came up. So one time we were driving down the road
and we passed by Monroe's place, and we saw it was empty.
He'd jus' packed up, I guess. Gon' up North or somethin'. And
I looked over at my daddy's face, and I'd knew that he had
done it. He saw that I knew-he was 'shamed. I guess he was
'shamed. He looked at me and said, "If you ain't any better
[Vol. 37:69
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than a nigger, son, who are you better than?"
- I think that's an excuse.
- No, it's not an excuse. It's jus' a story about my daddy.
- Where does that leave you?
- With an old man who was so full of hate, he didn't know
that being poor was what was kiUin' him.1
I. INTRODUCTION
In American society, the master narrative of black inferiority
provides the backdrop out of which this opening dialogue comes.
This narrative has a long pedigree,2 a pedigree that was institu-
tionalized in American Negro slavery.' The primary conse-
quence of this narrative has been race discrimination,4 includ-
1. Mississippi Burning (Orion 1989) (dialogue between two F.B.I. agents who
travelled to Mississippi to investigate the disappearance and presumed death of
three Freedom Riders). The story related above is not all that different from the
facts of United States v. McInnis, 976 F.2d 1226 (9th Cir. 1992) (affirming conviction
for use of force to interfere with minorities' housing rights).
2. See generally JOHN H. FRANKLIN, THE COLOR LINE: LEGACY FOR THE TWENTY-
FIRST CENTURY 5-26 (1993) (beginning with WE.B. Du Bois' "color-line" thesis and
discussing the continuing impact of race and racism in America's socio-political dis-
course); GEORGE M. FREDRICKSON, THE BLACK IMAGE IN THE WHITE MIND: THE DE-
BATE ON AFRO-AMERICAN CHARACTER AND DESTINY, 1817-1914 (1971) (analyzing shift-
ing and divergent white conceptions of Afro-American character and destiny);
WINTHROP D. JORDAN, WHITE OVER BLACK: AMERICAN ATrrUDEs TOWARD THE NE-
GRO, 1550-1812, at 3-43 (1968) (discussing the negative values Europeans ascribed to
black or African traits and how those values influenced even the poorest Anglo-
American to rationalize the racial oppression of blacks).
3. See generally LERONE BENNETT, JR., BEFORE THE MAYFLOWER: A -HISTORY OF
BLACK AMERICA (1987) (analyzing the development of institutionalized slavery within
the "black time line"); EUGENE D. GENOVESE, ROLL, JORDAN, ROLL: THE WORLD THE
SLAVES MADE (1974) (reviewing the history of slavery and its role in creating a sep-
arate black national culture); A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., IN THE MATTER OF COL-
OR: RACE & THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS: THE COLONIAL PERIOD (1978) (describing
legislative and judicial attitudes toward slavery in colonial America); KENNETH
STAMPP, PECULIAR INSTITUTION (1956) (tracing the development and effects of slavery
in the United States). For an excellent historical analysis of the impact of slavery on
free blacks, see IRA BERLIN, SLAVES WITHOUT MASTERS: THE FREE NEGRO IN THE
ANTEBELLUM SOUTH (1974).
4. See, e.g., RICHARD A. APOSTLE ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF RACIAL ATTITUDES 24-
25 (1983). Professors Apostle, Charles Y. Glock, and Marijean Suelzle and Research
Associate Thomas Piazza illustrated this point in the following interview:
I (interviewer): What do you feel are the essential differences between
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:69
ing housing segregation.' Confronted with the long history of
racially discriminatory structures in the housing market, Con-
gress enacted the Fair Housing Act (FHA or the Act) as Title
VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968.6 After more than twenty-
five years and several legislative amendments, however, housing
segregation remains extant.7 To this extent, the FHA has failed,
and will continue to fail, until its prohibitive scope, bounded as
it is by racial limits and constitutional constraints (e.g., the First
Amendment), is broadened to cope with the master narrative of
black inferiority.
The FHA's prohibitive scope must be broadened to cope deci-
sively with three powerful forces revealed in the opening dia-
logue-the master narrative of black inferiority, dominant white
images, and the violence of neighborhood purity. The master
narrative of black inferiority means the absolutely dominant or
privileged story that defines how blacks win or lose, succeed or
fail.' This story depends on social mythology9 and has been pre-
the races?
R (respondent): Whites are obviously of the higher intellectual quality.
This is proved by the fact that mostly whites have high governmental
positions. Blacks tend to be lazy and live on welfare. They seem to have
little intellectual capacity except in athletics. Orientals are quiet and
work hard. There are definite physical differences.
I: Are you saying that whites are generally superior to minority groups?
R: Oh, certainly. All the great thinkers have been white. Leaders
too....
I: Why aren't [blacks] ambitious?
R: It's in their genes-their makeup. Blacks have no inborn achievement.
They are not energetic, not self-starters.
Id.
5. See generally JAMES A. KUSHNER, FAIR HOUSING: DISCRIMINATION IN REAL ES-
TATE, COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, AND REVITALIZATION 51-409 (1983) (describing dif-
ferent forms of discrimination within the housing market); HERMAN H. LONG &
CHARLES S. JOHNSON, PEOPLE V. PROPERTY: RACE RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS IN Hous-
ING (1947) (focusing on housing discrimination in urban communities in the United
States); CLEMENT E. VOsE, CAUCASIANS ONLY: THE SUPREME COURT, THE NAACP,
AND THE RESTRICTIVE COVENANT CASES (1959) (tracing the sociological and political
events leading to the abrogation of restrictive racial covenants).
6. Fair Housing Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 81 (codified as amend-
ed at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631).
7. See Karl Taeuber, The Contemporary Context of Housing Discrimination, 6
YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 339, 344-45 (1988).
8. See generally JOEL KOVEL, WHITE RACISM: A PSYCHOHISTORY (1970) (analyzing
racism as a product of the historical development of Western culture); Lisa Ikemoto,
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viously defined" as a "preexisting narrative."" Taking the
myth and the story together, the master narrative of black infe-
riority is a systemic story, whether openly spoken or silently
acted upon,' that describes, solely on racial terms, how and
why whites' legitimately hold power over blacks. 4 Although
Traces of the Master Narrative in the Story of African American/Korean American
Conflict How We Constructed "Los Angeles," 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1581 (1993) (discuss-
ing the post-riot analysis of racial conflict in Los Angeles).
9. For a discussion of social mythology, see PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY
OF RACE AND RIGHTS: A DIARY OF A LAW PROFESSOR 8-9 (1991) (discussing the myth
of tortfeasors on a remote island simply waiting to be discovered by practitioners of
Western jurisprudence).
10. See Reginald Leamon Robinson, "The Other Against Itself': Deconstructing the
Violent Discourse Between Korean and African Americans, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 15, 18
n.4 (1993).
11. By "preexisting narrative," I mean an understanding whether true, fac-
tual, or descriptive of generalizable "traits or characteristics" of a particu-
lar group of people. These "traits or characteristics" generally focus on
race, even though "race" is not an objective notion; it is socially con-
structed' and legally enforced.... Such "traits and characteristics" be-
come the defining social lenses through which the dominant class views
the "offending" racial group. However, these "traits or characteristics" are
not supported by scientific evidence .... Thus, any view held by whites
of the African American inferiority is mytho-narrative. .-. . At least as
early as the 1600s, Europeans fashioned views of Africans that reinforced
white superiority, and in the 1900s white Americans reinforced their
perceived superiority on the backs of African Americans. In this way, a
preexisting narrative of black inferiority predates the United States's
founding.. . . It predates enforced slavery and Plessys legalized segre-
gation. It is fiction, it lacks scientific evidence, and it is simply mytho-
narrative.
Id. (citations omitted).
12. See ALEXANDER THOMAS & SAMUEL SILLEN, RACISM AND PSYCHIATRY 114-17
(1972) (critiquing the limits of a purely psychoanalytic approach to studying and
understanding white racism). See generally Charles R. Lawrence ]I1, The Id, the Ego,
and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317
(1987) (challenging the intentionallunintentional discrimination dichotomy and the
Supreme Court's discriminatory purpose doctrine); David B. Oppenheimer, Negligent
Discrimination, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 899 (1993) (arguing that racial discrimination is
more closely analogous to negligent conduct than it is to intentional conduct).
13. "Whites" is not used in this Article to refer to any specific group of white
persons, but to refer to white people who do believe that blacks are generally worth-
less. Most people would concede that most whites do communicate or hold such
views. See KOVEL, supra note 8, at 52 (discussing the cultural stereotypes of blacks
that "may have, under the impetus of moral censure, [been] driven ... from [a
person's] consciousness into a latent zone that is not activated until a black at-
tempts to move in next door or pays attention to his daughter"). Rather, in making
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it depends more on mythology than reliable empirical evi-
dence,15 the master narrative of black inferiority is both perva-
sive and powerful.
In the fair housing context, the master narrative of black
inferiority operates coterminously with dominant white images.
Dominant white images are a set of pervasive images, such as
photographs, that explicitly or implicitly connote whose values,
points of view, and symbols are important. These connotations
reinforce the view that blacks are inferior to whites, a violent-
ly oppressive perspective rooted in American Negro slavery,'
Reconstruction's de facto slavery," and post-Plessy's formal
American apartheid. 9 During these social eras, white males
this point, this Article includes those individuals who tell stories that fit the master
narrative of black inferiority as well as those individuals who neither tell stories nor
write missives, but by their conduct ever so subtly make distinctions between whites
and blacks. In either case, their actions create a totalizing story-the master narra-
tive of black inferiority.
14. See, e.g., FREDRICKSON, supra note 2.
15. See id. at 1.
In the years immediately before and after 1800, white Americans often
revealed by their words and actions that they viewed Negroes as a per-
manently alien and unassimilable element of the population. Yet articu-
late whites of that period were characteristically unable, and perhaps
even unwilling, to defend their anti-Negro predispositions by presenting
anything that resembled a "scientific" or philosophical case for the innate
moral and intellectual inferiority of the black race.
Id.
16. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987) (rejecting claims that Geor-
gia conducted the death penalty in a racially discriminatory manner in violation of
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments); see also Note, Racial Steering in the Ro-
mantic Marketplace, 107 HARV. L. REV. 877 (1994) (studying the use of racial prefer-
ences in personal ads).
17. See LEON F. LITWACK, NORTH OF SLAVERY (1961); CHARLES S. MANGUM, JR.,
THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE NEGRO (1940).
18. See ERIC FONER, A SHORT HISTORY OF RECONSTRUCTION (1990); C. VANN
WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW (1966).
After participating in the political process for less than a decade in the
1860s and 1870s, they were stripped of every vestige of citizenship by
one of the most merciless, terror-driven assaults in the annals of modern
history. Black men who dared to vote were lynched, and schools that
black children dared to attend were burned to the ground, all in the
name of the maintenance of high moral and educational standards.
FRANKLIN, supra note 2, at 6.
19. See Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435 (1970) (approving the reversion of a trust
corpus when the discriminatory purpose of the trust was frustrated); Plessy v.
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and their images were valued highly.2" Conversely, blacks and
their images were derided by whites,2 who promoted white
images that created, and today maintain, a degree of comfort for
white males. Dominant white images authenticated a world that
did not include blacks.' When blacks attempted to, live in pre-
dominantly white communities, they faced violence in all forms
and at all levels.' When these messages were coupled with vio-
Ferguson; 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (approving "separate but equal" passenger train ac-
commodations); Corrigan v. Buckley, 299 F. 899 (D.C. Cir. 1924) (permitting cove-
nants that prevented rental or sale to racial minorities), appeal dismissed, 271 U.S.
323 (1926); Leathers v. Old Fellows' Rest Cemetery, 69 So. 858 (La. 1915) (suggest-
ing in dictum that deed restrictions voided right to bury minorities on deeded prop-
erty); Leeper v. Charlotte Park & Recreation Comm'n, 88 S.E.2d 114 (N.C. 1955),
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 983 (1956); Taeuber, supra note 7, at 344-45 (describing in-
stitutional racism as a persistent feature of American society); see also MANNING
MARABLE, HOW CAPTALISM UNDERDEVELOPED BLACK AMERICA (1983) (examining how
the black community is exploited by racism and capitalism); A. Leon Higginbotham,
Jr., An Open Letter to Justice Clarence Thomas from a Federal Judicial Colleague,
140 U. PA. L. REV. 1005 (1992) (urging an ongoing battle against oppression and
inequality).
20. See Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Images of the Outsider in American
Law and Culture: Can Free Expression Remedy Systemic Social ills?, 77 CORNELL L.
REV. 1258 (1992).
We choose racism and racial depiction as our principal illustration. Sever-
al museums have featured displays of racial memorabilia from the past.
One exhibit recently toured the United States; in January, Time reviewed
the opening of another. Filmmaker Marlon Riggs produced an award-
winning one-hour documentary, Ethnic Notions, with a similar focus.
Each of these collections depicts a shocking parade of Sambos, mammies,
coons, uncles-bestial or happy-go-lucky, watermelon-eating--African-
Americans. They show advertising logos and household commodities in
the shape of blacks with grotesquely exaggerated facial features. They
include minstrel shows and film clips depicting blacks as so incompetent,
shuffling, and dim-witted that it is hard to see how they survived to
adulthood. Other images depict primitive, terrifying, larger-than-life black
men in threatening garb and postures, often with apparent designs on
white women.
Id. at 1259-60 (citations omitted). For another example of an arena where white
images are highly valued, see Martha Minow & Elizabeth Spelman, In Context, 63
S. CAL. L. REV. 1597, 1600-01 (1990) (arguing that some models of logic exclude
women and minorities).
21. See Delgado &.Stefancic, supra note 20, at 1260, 1261-67 (discussing how the
dominant society presented images of African Americans in negative, derogatory, and
stereotypical ways).
22. See generally FREDRICKSON, supra note 2 (describing the interplay of basic ra-
cial conceptions with social or political ideologies).
23. See Indira A.R. Lakshmanan, Hate-Crime Reports Rise in Boston, BOSTON
76 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:69
lence, blacks like Monroe encountered the physical trauma of
these dominant messages.24 In America's history of race rela-
tions, dominant white images tell blacks expressly and implicitly
that they are not welcome in white neighborhoods.'
As this Article will illustrate, and as the history of American
race relations reveals, dominant white images can and do con-
tribute to racial violence-the violence of neighborhood purity.
Those who promote neighborhood purity reject the integration of
blacks and whites, believing that blacks adulterate good commu-
nities by their presence.26 This Article argues that the prove-
nance of neighborhood purity lies not only in the master narra-
GLOBE, June 20, 1994 (National/Foreign), at 1.
In an analysis of Boston police figures from 1991-1992, researchers at
Northeastern found the most common type of hate crime was a physical
assault committed by a group of white, teen-age males. "Reactive hate
crimes" targeted at people perceived as threatening the perpetrator's way
of life were the next most common, and "mission hate crimes" committed
by those dedicated to bigotry, were the least common, with only one
incident.
Id.
24. See, e.g., id.
25. See, e.g., Scott Harris, Glendale: Where Image and Fact Sometimes Clash, L.A.
TIMES, Sept. 8, 1994, at B3.
In the past Glendale also has been a magnet for white supremacists,
who have been known to spray swastikas in public places and, in a pecu-
liar nod to suburban convention, to apply for barbecue permits in order
to burn crosses on neighborhood lawns .... Mt's easy to understand why
non-Christian, non-whites didn't consider Glendale to be a particularly
friendly place.
Id.
26. See Derrick Bell & Linda Singer, Making a Record, 26 CONN. L. REV. 265
(1993).
Either way, African-Americans, whose achievements "forever enjoy only a
presumption of theft," are the wrongdoers, stealing jobs from more de-
serving whites. Slogans shouted by white demonstrators in Bensonhurst,
New York, where Yusuf Hawkins, a young African-American male, was
killed, illustrate the continuity between these images of African-Ameri-
cans as thieves of white privilege and the more easily recognized hate of
the not-so-distant past. "They rape our women, they take our jobs," some
whites yelled. The anger stemming from perceptions that African-Ameri-
cans are taking whites' jobs is as potent as the lynching-justifying anger
that they had taken whites' women.
Id. at 275-76 (quoting Jennifer M. Russell, On Being a Gorilla in Your Midst, or,
the Life of One Blackwoman in the Legal Academy, 28 HARV. CMR.-C.L. L. REV. 259,
259 (1993)).
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tive of black inferiority, but also in the dominant white images
undergirding this narrative. The violence of neighborhood purity
means physically or symbolically violent acts, committed by
whites, that affect how blacks enjoy their rental property or
private homes.' Physical violence is the use of force or threat
of force against blacks who live in predominantly white neigh-
borhoods. In instances of such violence, whites wilfully injure,
intimidate, or interfere with a black person living in a predomi-
nantly white neighborhood." Symbolic violence involves acts
such as cross burning," hate speech,3 or tire slashing.32
27. This conduct is actionable under 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1988), although the decision
in United States v. Lee, 6 F.3d 1297 (8th Cir. 1993), demonstrates how the Supreme
Court's decisions in RA. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992) (holding hate
speech ordinance unconstitutional on grounds of viewpoint discrimination), and Wis-
consin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194 (1993) (upholding enhanced sentence for racially
motivated battery), have imported First Amendment concerns into this analysis.
28. See Sofarelli v. Pinellas County, 931 F.2d 718 (11th Cir. 1991); United States
v. Salyer, 893 F.2d 113 (6th Cir. 1989); Stackhouse v. DeSitter, 620 F. Supp. 208
(N.D. Ill. 1985).
29. See 42 U.S.C. § 3631(a)-(e) (1988).
30. See RA.V., 112 S. Ct. 2538; United States v. J.H.II., 22 F.3cl 821 (8th Cir.
1994); Lee, 6 F.3d 1297; United States v. Hayward, 6 F.3d 1241 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 1369 (1993); United States v. Kissinger, 943 F.2d 50 (4th Cir.
1991); United States v. Gresser, 935 F.2d 96 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 805
(1991); Salyer, 893 F.2d 113; United States v. McDermott, 822 F. Supp. 582 (N.D.
Iowa 1993); see also Lyle Denniston, U.S. Seeks Authority over Cross-Burnings, BAL-
TIMORE SUN, Feb. 18, 1994, at A3.
Since [R.A.V.], cross-burnings have continued to occur, according to data
from the Klanwatch project of the Southern Poverty Law Center in Mont-
gomery, Ala. Based on what it concedes is incomplete data, the project
counted 117 cross-burnings in 1992-the last year reported. That was up
from 110 a year earlier. The project's preliminary data for 1993 indicate
some decline from the 1992 total.
Id. For additional discussion of the constitutional issues implicated by cross burn-
ings, see Maryland v. Sheldon, 629 A.2d 753 (Md. 1993) (holding that a Maryland
statute criminalizing the burning of a cross or other religious symbol on public or
private property, unless the property owner consents and the local fire department
has been notified, violates the First Amendment).
31. See, e.g., United States v. McInnis, 976 F.2d 1226, 1232 (9th Cir. 1992) ("The
poster with the swastika and the words 'Niggers Get Out! Go Back To Your Slums!'
is also probative to show that McInnis had the intent to interfere with the victim's
housing rights."); Woods-Drake v. Lundy, 667 F.2d 1198, 1203 (5th Cir. 1982)
('Lundy expressed his racial animus in the crudest terms, referring to plaintiffs'
guests as 'nigger trash.' Clearly, Mr. Lundy's behavior amounts to a willful and
gross disregard of plaintiffs' rights under Section 1982 and the Fair Housing Act.");
Allahar v. Zahora, No. 92 C 5648, 1992 WL 229537 (N.D. m. Sept. 11, 1992) (mem.)
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These acts do not physically injure blacks, but do damage them
emotionally.33 Blacks who suffer physical violence or who en-
dure symbolic violence often leave predominantly white neigh-
borhoods.34 Although the violence of neighborhood purity may
take different forms, it achieves the goal of keeping blacks out of
white communities and promotes the message: "Keep America
White.35
(explaining that defendant refused to perform a contract because he did not want
"niggers" living in the neighborhood). For analyses of constitutional limits on protect-
ing minorities from hate speech, see Richard Delgado, Words That Wound. A Tort
Action for Racial Insults, Epithets and Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
133, 159-65, 172-79 (1982); Charles R. Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Reg-
ulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431, 438-49, 462-66; Mari J.
Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH.
L. REV. 2320, 2353-58 (1989).
32. See, e.g., Blacks Plan To Protest in Chicago, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 21, 1989, at
A13 ("It is an unwritten rule in Chicago: Black people do not generally venture
into the Bridgeport neighborhood after dark. Over the years, that rule has been
underscored by more than a few beatings and tire slashings."); Ellen O'Brien, A
Family Weathers the Hate, PHILA. INQUIRER, Feb. 13, 1989, at BI (noting that a
black family recently locating in Hadden Township suffered BB shots, slashed tires,
and a racist letter threatening children's lives); Jerry Taylor, BHA Asks Mayoral
Committee To Help Ease Racial Tension, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 5, 1980 (Run of
Paper) (explaining that "black families had been driven from Fairmount [a predomi-
nantly white neighborhood] since 1975 by window-breaking, tire-slashing, racial
epithets and assaults").
33. See, e.g., Lee, 6 F.3d at 1298 (quoting a black woman who, upon seeing the
burning cross, stated that "I hope they don't come up here and burn us up").
34. See, e.g., Keith Aoki, Race, Space, and Place: The Relation Between Architec-
tural Modernism, Post-Modernism, Urban Planning, and Gentrification, 20 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 699, 755 n.202 (1993) (reviewing millionaire basketball star Dee Brown's
search for a new house after "the Boston incident in which . . . [he] was thrown to
the ground, handcuffed, and arrested after trying to drive through Newton, Massa-
chusetts, a wealthy, predominantly white suburb"); cf. WILLIAMS, supra note 9, at 58-
61 (discussing 1986 Howard Beach episode in which three black men were beaten
and chased after entering an all-white neighborhood).
35. Cf. THE JAPANESE PROBLEM IN CALIFORNIA (Tasuku Harada ed., R.B.E. Re-
search Assocs. 1971). In response to the question: "Will you mention some of the
more important objections or grievances against Japanese in California, or in the
United States?", Professor H. Cooley, Department of Sociology, University of Michi-
gan, argued:
It is my observation that nearly all Americans like the Japanese. It
is generally admitted that they are personally delightful, and they are
much more popular in this regard than, say, the Jews. But many think
they are -collectively dangerous, either as a nation or as groups of settlers
in America. My own opinion is that they are in no way dangerous to us
so long as they do not settle here in large numbers. There is a wide-
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The master narrative of black inferiority, dominant white
images, and the violence of neighborhood purity are all present
in the opening dialogue of Mississippi Burning."6 The master
narrative of black inferiority rejects any notion that blacks are
equal or superior to whites.7 When Monroe acquired land and
purchased a mule, he challenged the master narrative." As a
result, a white man, threatened by the possibility of black suc-
cess, destroyed the mule.39 The story of Monroe suggests that if
blacks succeed in a manner that undermines white proprietor-
ship," whites must then question their own social mytholo-
gies.4 To avoid engaging in this form of racial introspection, a
spread belief, based on experience, that if they did they would form un-
assimilated groups, and thus destroy the homogeneity of our population.
Why this should be the case with Orientals more than with Europeans it
is hard to say, but it seems to be a fact, and we must be guided by
facts. Much as I like the Japanese I am opposed to their immigration.
Id. at 17. Similarly, in response to the question: "What do you consider the principal
reasons of the present anti-Japanese agitations in California: are they economic, so-
cial, or racial?", Reverend W.B. Thorp of the Congregational Church in Palo Alto,
California, stated:
The primary cause of the anti-Japanese agitation in California is un-
doubtedly racial. A body of Western immigrants doing precisely the
things the Japanese are doing in California would be welcomed and
praised. The agitation is essentially agitation for racial homogeneity in
this land. Its most telling slogan is "Keep California White."
Id. at 16 (emphasis added).
36. See supra text accompanying note 1.
37. See, e.g., The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (holding that the Thir-
teenth Amendment related only to slavery and that the Civil Rights Act of 1875 was
unconstitutionally applied to the states).
38. Cf. FONER, supra note 18, at 184-91 (describing the efforts of the Ku Klux
Klan); MANGUM, supra note 17, at 274-307 (discussing violence against blacks and
the burning of towns); IDA B. WELLS-BARNETT, ON LYNCHINGS (1969) (stating that
upstart blacks were often lyached by whites).
39. See supra text accompanying note 1.
40. See Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1709 (1993)
(investigating how property rights are contingent on, and intertwined with, race); see
also Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889) (upholding the legislative
exclusion of aliens); Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823) (restricting recognition
of land grants from Native American tribes).
41. Cf. ROLLO MAY, THE CRY FOR MYTH (1991) (describing the unsound psychiatric
treatment of a schizophrenic woman).
[W]hen Dr. Frieda had to go to Europe for a summer, Deborah was
temporarily assigned to a younger psychiatrist who was imbued with the
new rationalism. This psychiatrist marched in to destroy the "delusions"
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type of reflection that destroys all that is certain and concrete,
whites use violence to force blacks back into the master
narrative's oppressive straits.42
In addition to violence, whites become overly focused on
blacks, an obsession that racializes the entirety of their experi-
ence.13 As explained in a 1985 study of white working-class
Americans who defected from the Democratic party:44
[t]hese... defectors express a profound distaste for blacks, a
sentiment that pervades almost everything they think about
government and politics. Blacks constitute the explanation
for their vulnerability and for almost everything that has
gone wrong in their lives; not being black is what constitutes
being middle class; not living with blacks is what makes a
neighborhood a decent place to live.... These sentiments
have important implications,... as virtually all progressive
symbols and themes have been redefined in racial and pejora-
tive terms. 5
of Deborah with no understanding whatever of Deborah's need for her
myths. The result was that Deborah, her whole system of gods and their
extraterrestrial kingdom in shambles, deteriorated markedly. She re-
gressed into a completely withdrawn world. She set fire to the sanatori-
um, burned and maimed herself, and behaved like a human being whose
humanity is destroyed. For this is literally what had happened. Her
soul-defined as the most intimate and fundamental function of her con-
sciousness-was taken away, and she had literally nothing to hold on to.
Id. at 19.
42. See MICHAL R. BELKNAP, FEDERAL LAW AND SOUTHERN ORDER: RACIAL VIO-
LENCE AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT IN THE POST-BROWN SOUTH 3-26 (1987).
Belknap notes that during slavery, some effective restraints prevented whites from
wantonly killing slaves. Id. at 4. He also notes that during Reconstruction,
[a]n exasperated federal army officer reported from Jefferson, Texas, that
"the civil officers cannot and will not punish these outrages." Nor would
southern juries. One judge observed in 1868 that it was "almost an im-
possibility . . . to convict a white man of any crime . . . where the vio-
lence has been against a black man."
Id. at 4-5.
43. See generally THOMAS B. EDSALL & MARY D. EDSALL, CHAIN REACTION: THE
IMPACT OF RACE, RIGHTS, AND TAXES ON AMERICAN POLITICS (1992) (discussing the
significance of race on political choices).
44. John 0. Calmore, Spatial Equality and the Kerner Commission Report: A
Back-To-The-Future Essay, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1487, 1499 (1993).
45. Id. at 1499-1500 (quoting Stanley Greenberg et al., Race, ATLANTIC MONTHLY,
May 1991, at 53, 56).
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Therefore, when blacks like Monroe acquire real property,
whites attempt to reinscribe blacks with the notion that they are
inferior, a reprogramming that depends heavily on reinforcing
dominant white images.46 Equally important, any success by
blacks like Monroe promotes the false zero-sum assumption that
whites have lost economic opportunities. As a consequence,
whites like the father in the opening dialogue become obsessed
with -the "Other." This obsession turns not only on false impres-
sions, but also on amplified and deeply held racial and personal
insecurities.47 The result is fairly predictable. Blacks who chal-
lenge the dominant white images are punished by whites and
encouraged to leave the community.
In the opening dialogue of this Article, the master narrative of
black inferiority resonates as a backdrop, while dominant white
images operate in the foreground. The father, for example, be-
came concerned that Monroe owned real property because Mon-
roe had bought a mule and was poised to increase his wealth. By.
owning land, buying a mule, and increasing his farm output,
Monroe suggested that blacks can be equal to whites. To this
extent, the master narrative became a context for punishing
Monroe and for reasserting dominant white images, images
never intended for blacks like Monroe." Based on this image,
whites believe they ought to succeed, even at the expense of
blacks.49 White success is the "stock" story.50 By succeeding,
46. See Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for
Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2411, 2412 (1989) ("The dominant group creates its own
stories, as well. The stories or narratives told by the ingroup remind it of its identi-
ty in relation to outgroups, and provide it with a form of shared reality in which its
own superior position is seen as natural.").
47. See EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 43, at 234-40 (describing how the black
underclass serves to reinforce racial preconceptions about black America).
48. See DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERicAN APARTHEID: SEGRE-
GATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 94 (1993) ("Given that a home is
widely viewed as a symbol of a person's worth, these views imply that whites per-
ceive blacks to be a direct threat to their social status.").
49. For example, the plaintiffs in both Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491
U.S. 164 (1989) (employee), and Reid v. Key Bank, 821 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1987) (credi-
tor), were blacks who had been exploited by others. See also DERRICK BELL, RACE,
RACISM, AND AMERICAN LAW § 1.14 (3d ed. 1993) (discussing racism based on lessons
drawn from the nineteenth century).
50. See Delgado, supra note 46, at 2418-26 (discussing the "stock" story as the
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blacks like Monroe mock the story and its images. By reassert-
ing these images, whites intensify metaracism,51 a systemic
form of conscious and unconscious racial oppression. By acting
consciously against a "nigger" and unconsciously through what
Joel Kovel calls a "symbolic matrix,"52 the father destroyed any
conflict between what Richard Delgado calls "ingroup reality"
and outgroup counterstory.53 By defeating Monroe's effort to
subvert the ingroup reality, the father reinforced the master
dominant narrative).
51. See Ikemoto, supra note 8, at 1585; see also KOVEL, supra note 8, at 211-12.
Racism, which began with the random oppression of another person,
and moved from directly dominative, systematic control of his being, into
abstracted averted use of his degradation, now passes beyond conscious-
ness, holding only to its inner connections with the symbolic matrix.
Metaracism is a distinct and very peculiar modern phenomenon. Racial
degradation continues on a different plane, and through a different agen-
cy: those who participate in it are not racists-that is, they are not ra-
cially prejudiced-but metaracists, because they acquiesce in the larger
cultural order which continues the work of racism. Although metaracism
is not the only form of modern American racial behavior, nor even the
predominant form at present, it is the form which seems in accord with
the latest version of the plague of history.
Id.
52. See KOVEL, supra note 8, at 93-105.
Since aversive responses occurred (and still occur) with such irrational
intensity, and moreover occurred in people who had little directly to do
with the Negro objects of the fantasy of dirt, then it follows that these
fantasies pervaded the lives of white Americans and are not limited to
racism. If such an infantile response can maintain such intensity in the
most mature and "normal" of adults, then there must be something at
large in culture to sustain it. The normal person is one who lives effec-
tively within his culture; his normality is grounded in a congruence be-
tween his ego and his culture. Therefore, the best-adjusted, most produc-
tive, and most typical of Americans who respond aversively to black peo-
ple they have not personally oppressed or even known, are no more than
vehicles for the larger and axiomatic ideas of their times. This implies
that the Negro is not actually the basic object of the fantasy, but a sub-
stitute, a surrogate. By virtue of the way he has been treated historical-
ly, he continues to represent in a concrete way something which persists
actively in white American culture at an unconscious level, and which ris-
es, as in racism, to find certain objects in the given world. As whites
continue to treat blacks in such a way as to sustain their debased posi-
tion within society, this in turn maintains the black's suitability to repre-
sent the white's fantasy.
Id. at 93-94 (emphasis added).
53. See Delgado, supra note 46, at 2411-15.
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narrative of black inferiority and the privileged status of domi-
nant white images. To this extent, this narrative and these im-
ages coexist.
In the opening dialogue, the master narrative of black inferi-
ority conjoins not only with dominant white images, but also
with the violence of neighborhood purity. In truth, the master
narrative of black inferiority has never physically violated
blacks, and dominant white images have never actually killed
blacks. Rather, as Patricia Williams points out, the narrative
and images murder blacks' spirit,5 making the violence of
neighborhood purity both physical and symbolic. Moreover, the
narrative and images create the milieu in which any violence by
whites toward blacks can be rationalized."
By physically killing Monroe's mule, the father in the opening
dialogue symbolically and mortally wounded Monroe. In addi-
tion, by killing the mule, the father destroyed the piece of
Monroe's property that mocked him personally, thereby denying
Monroe a socially sanctioned chance to relate to him as an
equal. Without this recognition, blacks like Monroe find the
manner in which they express their desire to be free, legally
endowed persons increasingly frustrated by whites. 6 Unfortu-
nately, by violating Monroe, the father impliedly embraced a
freedom that depends on denying blacks legal personhood.57
54. Patricia Williams, Spirit-Murdering the Messenger: The Discourse of
Fingerpointing as the Law's Response to Racism, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 127, 129
(1987).
55. See BELKNAP, supra note 42, at 3-5.
56. Cf JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY (1988) (comparing
different paradigms of property ownership).
57. See PAULO FREIRE, PEDAGOGY OF THE OPPRESSED 20-21 (Myra B. Ramos
trans., 1990).
Doubt regarding the possible effects of conscientizagdo implies a
premise which the doubter does not always make explicit: It is better for
the victims of injustice not to recognize themselves as such .... Fear of
freedom, of which its possessor is not necessarily aware, makes him see
ghosts. Such an individual is actually taking refuge in an attempt to
achieve security, which he prefers to the risks of liberty ... Men rarely
admit their fear of freedom openly, however, tending rather to camou-
flage it-sometimes unconsciously-by presenting themselves as defenders
of freedom. They give their doubt and misgivings an air of profound
sobriety, as befitting custodians of freedom. But they confuse freedom
with the maintenance of the status quo; so that if conscientizagdo threat-
84 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:69
Even though the father focused on Monroe's mule, the violence
was directed equally at Monroe, who consequently left town and
moved north. As a result, the father's neighborhood was a little
more white, a little more pure. Equally important, other blacks
became less inclined to follow in Monroe's footsteps. To this ex-
tent, the father's violence reveals the oppressive content of domi-
nant white images and the master narrative of black inferiority.
The Fair Housing Act cannot effectively redress housing seg-
regation until it recognizes the impact of the relationship be-
tween the master narrative of black inferiority, dominant white
images, and the violence of neighborhood purity. Presently, the
Fair Housing Act does not acknowledge this relationship. The
Act cannot end what its drafters by and large have not experi-
enced," and the courts cannot adjudge what they only know
ens to place that status quo in question, it thereby seems to constitute a
threat to freedom itself.
Id. at 20-21. In Reginald Leamon Robinson, Race, Myth, and Narrative in the Social
Construction of the Black Self 42-44 (1994) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author), it is asserted that:
Freire's argument is quite relevant here. To the extent that oppres-
sion is dialectical, that is, the oppressor depends on the oppressed for his
very status as master, then Mr. Gore qua white supremacist also (or qua
institutional gatekeepers) has an ego-centered commitment to this rela-
tionship. This commitment perforce represents a thorough grounding in
the socially-constructed mythologies both about masters and whites, and
about slaves and people of color. Once this mythology has been received
as a construct, it remains unquestioned, and, more importantly, neither
the oppressor nor the oppressed knows a reality outside of this
dialecticism. The mythology rationalizes the dialectical relationship, and
the relationship argues for the status quo notion of liberty. At some
point, some whites face a cruel irony. That is, whites spend their entire
lives, their human energies, as a bulwark for this mythology and its
associative institutional practices (e.g., employment discrimination). They
invest huge sums of psychic energy not in fulfilling their soul's desire for
True Liberty but in denying blacks and other people of color their equal
place in the world. As Professors James O'Fallon and Cheyney Ryan
would argue, when these whites fail to recognize blacks as equals, they
only succeed in repressing their own humanity. Later, some whites may
make the rude discovery: they have only a few degrees more liberty and
perhaps far less humanity than do blacks or the socialized Other. By
working to hold blacks back, whites have had to sacrifice their deep
desire for true recognition by staying behind to guard America's socio-psy-
chological internment camp called "Black Oppression."
Id. (citations omitted).
58. See Derrick Bell, Racial Realism, 24 CONN. L. REV. 363, 364 (1992) (tying the
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from a distance. 9 Without the experience, and with this dis-
tance, racial discrimination and housing segregation become not
a question of power and oppression, but one of poor judgment
and bad manners." In this regard, the Act does not end Ameri-
can apartheid, but promotes equal opportunity and what then-
Senator Walter Mondale called "basic decency in white Ameri-
ca."' If the Act does not seek out the racially oppressive master
narrative and the manner in which this narrative intersects
with the dominant white images and physical violence operating
behind housing segregation, then judges cannot eradicate what
legislators refuse to admit.62 In this way, the FHA embodies
serious limitations, in part constitutional, in part racial.
Few can dispute the proposition that the Fair Housing Act
operates within racial and constitutional limitations. First, the
Act cannot in and of itself eliminate racial discrimination and
housing segregation because the Act is remedial. As a result, if a
school of racial realists to the legal realism movement and its emphasis on practical
experience).
59. See Lisa J. Laplace, The Legality of Integration Maintenance Quotas: Fair
Housing or Forced Housing?, 55 BROOK. L. REV. 197, 211 (1989) (quoting then-Sena-
tor Mondale: "It is impossible to gauge the degradation and humiliation suffered by
a man in the presence of his wife and children-when he is told that despite his
university degrees, despite his income level, despite his profession, he is just not
good enough to live in a white neighborhood").
60. See Alan D. Freeman, Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review, in THE POLI-
TICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRrrIQUE 96, 96-116 (David Kairys ed., 1982); see also
Margalynne Armstrong, Desegregation Through Private Litigation: Using Equitable
Remedies To Achieve the Purposes of the Fair Housing Act, 64 TEMPLE L. REV. 909
(1991) (arguing for redress of minority group injuries through remedies such as
forced housing integration).
61. Laplace, supra note 59, at 212 ("Senator Mondale described the critical fair
housing debate as an issue of 'whether there is any basic decency in white America
and whether white America ever really intends to permit equality and full opportu-
nity to black Americans with all that equality and opportunity involves.'").
62. Cf Reginald Leamon Robinson, The Impact of Hobbes's Empirical Natural Law
on Title ViTs Effectiveness: A Hegelian Critique, 25 CONN. L. REV. 607, 664-77 (1993)
(raising this issue in the context of extant employment discrimination). In the con-
text of the FHA, Senator Edward Brooke admitted its limitation:
Fair housing does not promise to end the ghetto; it promises only to
demonstrate that the ghetto is not an immutable institution in America.
It will scarcely lead to a mass dispersal of the ghetto population to the
suburbs; but it will make it possible for those who have the resources to
escape the stranglehold now suffocating the inner cities of America.
Laplace, supra note 59, at 211 n.50 (citing 114 CONG. REC. 2279 (1968)).
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black person cannot show by adduced evidence that a real estate
advertisement expresses an illegal racial preference, then the
Act will not sanction either the newspaper or the real estate
advertiser. Judges determine what evidence makes this showing,
and these judges operate within a racist culture.63 To this ex-
tent, the Fair Housing Act, its interpretation, and its remedial
power offer limited redress for aggrieved blacks. Second, while
the Act does reach glaring examples of impermissible racial
preferences,64 it has failed to sanction more subtle forms of
racial preferences because such seemingly general liability might
run afoul of, or burden, the First Amendment.6" Meanwhile,
racial discrimination and housing segregation continue to flour-
ish in our constitutional democracy. Therefore, not only are
racism and democratic ideals coexistent and consistent social
practices, but also racism and the master narrative of black
inferiority have been indispensable to America's democratic
constitutionalism. Although racism thrives in today's social mi-
lieu, the Fair Housing Act and its remedial arm cannot achieve
a future in which racism does not exist. As a consequence, the
Act cannot end housing segregation because it cannot cope with
the constitutionalism that legitimizes the master narrative of
black inferiority.
Part II of this Article argues that a significant relationship
exists between the master narrative of black inferiority and the
history of housing segregation, and that the Act cannot eradicate
racial discrimination and housing segregation because it cannot
account for the most subtle forms of racial oppression. Toward
this end, Part III argues that the master narrative of black
63. See generally DAVID T. GOLDBERG, RACIST CULTURE: PHILOSOPHY AND THE
POLITICS OF MEANING (1993) (attributing racialized discourse to the dominant
culture's subjective categories and conceptions); MARGARET WETHERELL & JONATHAN
POTPER, MAPPING THE LANGUAGE OF RACISM: DISCOURSE AND THE LEGITIMATION OF
EXPLOITATION (1992) (undertaking a "discourse analysis" of the psychology of racism
within the New Zealand culture).
64. See United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205, 209 (4th Cir. 1972) (interpreting
the F-A to prohibit this advertisement: "FOR RENT-Furnished basement apart-
ment. In private white home.").
65. See Housing Opportunities Made Equal, Inc. (HOME) v. Cincinnati Enquirer,
Inc., 943 F.2d 644, 653 (6th Cir. 1991); see also infra part III and accompanying
text (developing this point).
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inferiority intersects with dominant white images and the vio-
lence of neighborhood purity. Consequently, while the Act can
cope adequately with clear patterns, practices, and expressions
that violate the advertisement preference provisions of the
Act,66 it cannot cope with general or aggregate messages in
which the most subtle forms of impermissible racial preferences
occur. Part IV insists that an equal image model begins to re-
spond adequately to the Act's failure to recognize the intersec-
tion between dominant white images and the violence that ex-
cludes blacks from predominantly white communities. In sum,
this Article argues that both all-white human model advertising
campaigns and violence are virtually interdependent aspects of
the master narrative of black inferiority, and as long as the Fair
Housing Act ignores this intersection it will fail to achieve the
goals of nondiscrimination and integration.
II. THE FAIR HOUSING ACT: EXTANT HOUSING SEGREGATION
AND RACIAL LIMITATIONS
A. The Relationship Between Housing Segregation and the
Master Narrative of Black Inferiority: A Brief Overview
In America, the master narrative of black inferiority explains
the historical practices of housing segregation67 and remains
extant more than twenty-five years after the enactment of the
Fair Housing Act.' Since the arrival of Africans in this coun-
try, America has been committed to discrimination and oppres-
66. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (1988). Under this subsection, it is unlawful to
make, print, or publish, or cause to be made, printed, or published any
notice, statement, or advertisement, with respect to the sale or rental of
a dwelling that indicates any preference, limitation, or discrimination
based on race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national
origin, or an intention to make any such preference, limitation, or dis-
crimination.
Id.
67. See FRANKLIN, supra note 2, at 64-65; JORDAN, supra note 2, at 295; LONG &
JOHNSON, supra note 5, at 102-05; Calmore, supra note 44, at 1489 (citing Karl
Taeuber, supra note 7, at 339 (MTe racial structure of housing in the United States
is rooted in history.")).
68. See GEORGE M. FREDRICKSON, WHITE SUPREMACY: A COMPARATIVE STUDY IN
AMERICAN & SOUTH AFRICAN HISTORY (1981); DOUGLAS G. GLASGOw, THE BLACK
UNDERCLASS: POVERTY, UNEMPLOYMENT, AND ENTRAPMENT OF GHETT6 YOUTH (1981).
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sion.69 This commitment has created "two cities"--one white,
one black-as well as a host of social evils, ° including crime
and poor health.7 These "two cities" are natural and foresee-
able consequences of American Negro slavery, the Black
Codes, and America's post-Plessy,72 apartheid policies. 3 Each
experience serves as a version of the master narrative of black
inferiority."4
During American Negro slavery, racial discrimination in hous-
ing patterns did not occupy center stage as a vehicle for enforc-
ing the master narrative of black inferiority. Through the rather
elaborate checks and balances of America's "peculiar institu-
tion,"" people understood that blacks and whites lived in sepa- -
rate worlds, even if they lived in relatively close proximity to
each other 6 or cavorted together." After all, masters and
69. KUSHNER, supra note 5, at 1.
70. Taeuber, supra note 7, at 342-43.
71. See LITWACK, supra note 17, at 168-70; REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY
COMM'N OF CIVIL DISORDERS 266-73 (1968) [hereinafter KERNER COMMISSION].
72. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
73. See Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323 (1926) (upholding lower court decision
allowing property owners to enter into covenants not to sell property to Negroes); see
also A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., A Tribute to Justice Thurgood Marshall, 105 HARV.
L. REV. 55, 59-64 (1991) (focusing on the aftermath of Plessy); Iigginbotham, supra
note 19, at 1022-25 (describing segregationalist housing statutes in the early twenti-
eth century).
74. In Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968), Justice Stewart elo-
quently made this point:
Just as the Black Codes, enacted after the Civil War to restrict the free
exercise of those rights [granted by the Thirteenth Amendment], were
substitutes for the slave system, so the exclusion of Negroes from white
communities became a substitute for the Black Codes. And when racial
discrimination herds men into ghettos and makes their ability to buy
property turn on the color of their skin, then it too is a relic of slavery.
Id. at 441-43.
75. See generally VERGE LAKE & PAULI MURRAY, STATES' LAWS ON RACE & COLOR
(Supp. 1955) (listing examples of statutory discrimination); STAMPP, supra note 3
(describing slavery in the antebellum South).
76. See KENNETH B. CLARK, DARK GI-IETro: DILEMMAS OF SOCIAL POWER 22 (1965)
("In Charleston, South Carolina, for example, racial residential patterns reflect slav-
ery days, and whites and Negroes tend to live in the same area as they did before
Emancipation. Negro servants can come into any area and live in white homes with-
out a lifted eyebrow.").
77. See A. Leon Ilgginbotham, Jr. & Barbara K. Kopytoff, Racial Purity and
Interracial Sex in the Law of Colonial and Antebellum Virginia, 77 GEO. L.J. 1967
(1989) (discussing Virginia's efforts to prevent the blurring of the race lines and
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white men had legalized violence at their immediate dispos-
al. 8 In the final analysis, what mattered most was that
housing patterns did not undermine the master narrative of
black inferiority.7
9
Blacks and whites have, to varying degrees, always lived in
two different worlds. 0 For example, in the antebellum period,
most blacks were slaves, and, with few exceptions, almost all
slaves lived on plantations."' In that situation, whites could
more easily tolerate blacks living immediately next door.82
Slavery's legal norms impressed rather clear social roles upon
both whites and blacks,' and, within its hellgates, legal sanc-
tions and violence countenanced few deviants.84
maintain its elaborate system of white superiority).
78. See, e.g., State v. Mann, 13 N.C. 167 (1829); HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 3, at
255; see BELKNAP, supra note 42, at 2.
Southern law placed blacks at the mercy not only of their owners but of
an entire race. Every white was authorized to apprehend any Negro
unable to give a satisfactory account of himself. In South Carolina, if a
slave found off the plantation refused to submit to interrogation, his
white questioner could summarily execute him. Even for mere insolence,
a member of the master race had the right to beat either a slave or a
free Negro.
Id. However, "[wihile antebellum southern law legitimated and incorporated into the
legal system a vast range of violent acts by white private citizens, it did impose
some restraints on the use of force against blacks." Id. at 2.
79. See CLARK, supra note 76, at 22.
It is not the sitting [or living] next to a Negro [] or washing at the next
basin that is repulsive to a white, but the fact that -this implies equal
status. Historically, the most intimate relationships have been approved
between Negro and white so long as status of white superiority versus
Negro inferiority has been clear.
Id.
80. See generally BELL, supra note 49 §§ 1.1-.17 (reviewing'the history of Ameri-
can racism); LrWACK, supra note 17 (describing treatment of Negroes in antebellum
north); HOWARD N. RABINOWITZ, RACE RELATIONS IN THE URBAN SOUTH 1865-1890
(1978) (reviewing the pattern of race relations that existed during this era and not-
ing that its legacy remains today).
81. See GENOVESE, supra note 3, at 10-13; JORDAN, supra note 2, at 101-03;
STAMPP, supra note 3, at 3-12.
82. RABINOWITZ, supra note 80, at 97.
83. See generally Higginbotham & Kopytoff, supra note 77, at 1975-88 (analyzing
cultiral and statutory classifications of race).
84. LITWACK, supra note 17, at 110.
"Some persons think," a Boston Negro leader remarked in 1860, "that
because we have the right to vote, and enjoy the privilege of being
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Whites created ghettos through these sanctions and violence.
For example, in the 1850s, blacks lived and socialized in
Boston's "Nigger Hill" and "along the wharves in 'New Guinea."'
"Little Africa," with its crowded wooden shacks and shanties
was home to Cincinnati's blacks. In New York, blacks and poor
whites were corralled in "Five Points," a notorious neighborhood
that one visitor described as "but a step into Hades" and "the
worst hell of America." 5 Once poorer blacks entered the ghet-
tos, they found it virtually impossible to leave. 6
If blacks did not live in "Hades" or 'hell," they lived in segre-
gated but exclusive districts 7 because despite their financial
squeezed up in an omnibus, and stared out of a seat in a horse-car, that
there is less prejudice here than there is farther South." This was only
partially true, he continued, for "it is five times as hard to get a house
in a good location in Boston as it is in Philadelphia, and it is ten times
as difficult for a colored mechanic to get work here as it is in Charles-
ton." Moreover, local restaurants, hotels, and theaters continued to ex-
clude the Negro, while at least two amusement places helped to perpetu-
ate existing prejudices through constant caricature and ridicule.
Id. (citation omitted).
85. LUTWACK, supra note 17, at 168 (citations omitted). These ghettos had a tre-
mendous impact on the health of black residents. For example,
[iun New York City, tuberculosis proved fatal to twice as many blacks as
whites, a reflection of adverse living conditions. Philadelphia's coroner
attributed the high mortality rate in Negro districts to intemperance,
exposure, and malnutrition. After conducting an inspection in 1848, he
reported that many Negroes had been "found dead in cold and exposed
rooms and garrets, board shanties five and six feet high, and as many
feet square, erected and rented for lodging purposes, mostly without any
comforts, save the bare floor, with the cold penetrating between the
boards, and through the holes and crevices on all sides." Some bodies
had been recovered "in cold, wet, and damp cellars," while still others
had been found lying in back yards and alleys.
Id. at 169 (citations omitted). According to a southern visitor to a northern city, the
conditions in which blacks lived demonstrated the folly of emancipation.
"Thar they was," . . . "covered with rags and dirt, livin in houses and
cellars, without hardly any furniture; and sum of 'er without dores or
winders .... This, thinks I, is nigger freedom; this is the condition to
which the filanthropists of the North wants to bring the happy black
people of the South!"
Id. at 168-69 (citations omitted).
86. See, e.g., ARNOLD R. HIRSCH, MAKING THE SECOND GHETTO: RACE AND HOUS-
ING IN CHICAGO, 1940-1960, at 16-20 (1983).
87. LITWACK," supra note 17, at 168-69 (stating that "some observers ... pointed
to the remarkable number of fine houses owned by Negroes in attractive neighbor-
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wherewithal, they were excluded from all-white neighborhoods.
Although whites in the 1700s and 1800s perceived blacks-as a
threat to common decency, civility, and everyday expectations,
"[tihe fear of depreciated property values overrode virtually
every other consideration.""8
As early as 1793, the attempt to locate "a Negro hut' in Sa-
lem, Massachusetts, prompted a white minister to protest
that such buildings depreciated property, drove out decent
residents, and generally injured the welfare of the neighbor-
hood. Some years later, New Haven petitioners complained
that the movement of Negroes into previously white
neighborhoods deteriorated real estate values from 20 to 50
per cent; and Indianan asserted that the proposed establish-
ment of a Negro tract would reduce the value of nearby
white-owned lots by at least 50 per cent. Obviously, then, the
Negro had to be contained in his own area. Thus when a
Boston Negro schoolmistress considered moving to a better
neighborhood, the inhabitants of the block where she pro-
posed to settle resolved either to eject her or to destroy the
house. By 1847, the residents of South Boston could boast
that "not a single colored family" lived among them-only
immigrants "of the better class who will not live in cel-
lars.""9
This fear formed the bulwark against any migration by well-to-
do blacks from even exclusive Negro communities into all-white
neighborhoods.
By the 1860s, despite violent efforts to remove blacks from,
and to prevent them from entering, white neighborhoods, blacks
and whites could still be found "living next to one another in
certain sections of the city."0 Such race mixing, however, was
usually limited to'special economic circumstances. Blacks either
worked for their white neighbors, or whites were too poor to
leave the neighborhoods. When they had the economic where-
withal to do so, however, whites often did not hesitate to
hoods," and the fact that "middle- and upper-class Negroes maintained some respect-
able living quarters").
88. Id. at 169.
89. Id. at 169-70 (citation omitted).
90. RABINOWITZ, supra note 80, at 97.
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leave.91
After the Civil War, the master narrative of black inferiority
came under immediate attack, and housing patterns changed as
blacks became active politically, socially, and economically.92
The South could no "longer formally and openly... incorporate
white violence against blacks into its positive law." 3 Black ser-
vants, by living next to their white employers, undermined the
master narrative of black inferiority. In addition to the extrale-
gal violence that whites used to reestablish white race domi-
nance,94 whites in both the North and South sought new ways
to prevent blacks from breaking out of ghettos and leaving the
South. 5
At the close of the nineteenth century, "Black-belt neighbor-
hoods" or "nigger towns" were created by the enactment of race
segregation ordinances," which mushroomed in number97
after the Supreme Court gave federal imprimatur to American
apartheid in Plessy v. Ferguson." When the Supreme Court
struck down these local schemes on constitutional grounds, it
did so because they violated a white property owner's right to
alienate his property.99 For example, in Buchanan v.
Warley,1 ° the Supreme Court invalidated a local segregative
ordinance on two grounds. First, because the ordinance violated
a white owner's right to sell his property to any willing black
buyer, it could not be justified as an exercise of a state's police
91. See MAINGUM, supra note 17, at 44.
92. See W.E.B. Du Bois, The Social Effects of Emancipation (Feb. 1, 1913), reprint-
ed in WE.B. Du Bois: A READER 71 (Meyer Weinberg ed., 1970).
93. BELKNAP, supra note 42, at 4.
94. See id. at 4-26 (discussing the use of lynching to control, dominate, and ex-
ploit African Americans).
95. See Leland B. Ware, New Weapons for an Old Battle: The Enforcement Pro-
visions of the 1988 Amendments to the Fair Housing Act, 7 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 59,
60-61 (1993).
96. See id.
97. See, e.g., Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
98. 163 U.S. 537 (1896); see Higginbotham, supra note 19, at 1009-10;
Higginbotham, supra note 73, at 56-59.
99. Many whites challenged such segregation ordinances because as landlords, they
did not want to surrender their right to rent even to blacks, and because as real
estate brokers, they wished to buy property cheaply by permitting blacks to enter
certain neighborhoods. See MANGUM, supra note 17, at 139-40.
100. 245 U.S. 60.
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power.'' Second, the ordinance violated the Fifth Amendment
because it took property by inverse condemnation, preventing a
white owner from disposing of his property.0 2 After Buchanan,
one state sought to protect vested property rights by "forbidding
the occupancy of a dwelling on a city block by members of one
race where the block is inhabited only by the other race."0 3
The Maryland Court of Appeals decided that this ordinance dif-
fered little from the Buchanan scheme and invalidated it.' °4
Even .though the housing segregation ordinances did not pass
constitutional muster, whites were motivated by the same con-
cern as were their legislatures-separating the races. Because
state involvement created constitutional infirmities, whites
turned to alternative arrangements-private agreements 5 or
covenants.' As late as the 1940s and 1950s, if blacks moved
in, whites moved out soon thereafter. 7  In Shelley v.
101. Id. at 74.
102. See MANGUM, supra note 17: at 142; see also A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. et al.,
De Jure Housing Segregation in the United States and South Africa: The Difficult
Pursuit of Racial Justice, 1990 U. ILL. L. REV. 763, 767 (discussing Buchanan).
103. MANGtUM, supra note 17, at 142 (discussing Jackson v. State, 103 A. 910
(1918)).
104. Jackson, 103 A. 910.
105. See MANGUM, supra note 17, at 144.
Certain citizens of the city of Dallas, both white and colored, entered into
a voluntary agreement to district the city in such a manner as to segre-
gate the two races. The city then enacted an ordinance punishing crimi-
nally a breach of the agreement. In a suit to enjoin the enforcement of
this ordinance, the court asserted that since a direct segregation ordi-
nance is invalid, an enactment punishing the breach of an agreement to
do the same thing is also of no effect.
Id.
106. See generally LONG & JOHNSON, supra note 5, at 10-38 (discussing the devel-
opment of race restrictive covenants); MAGNUM, supra note 17, at 143-50 (discussing
a number of private housing segregation schemes); VOSE, supra note 5, at 56-57, 68
(noting the .court battles over racially restrictive housing covenants); Timothy Jost,
The Defeasible Fee and the Birth of the Modern Residential Subdivision, 49 Mo. L.
REV. 695, 724-25 (1984) (reviewing race restrictions in housing developments).
107. See, e.g., 1 ST. CLAIR DRAKE & HORACE R. CAYTON, BLACK METROPOLIS: A
STUDY OF NEGRO LIFE IN A NORTHERN CITY (1970); HIRSCH, supra note 86, at 5.
The census figures for 1950 revealed not a city undergoing deseg-
regation but one in the process of redefining racial borders after a period
of relative stability. Black isolation was, in fact, increasing even as the
Black Belt grew. Nearly 53% of the city's blacks lived in exclusively
black census tracts in 1950 compared with only 49.7% in 1940; more
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Kraemer,' the Court prohibited state courts from enforcing
these private schemes."9 Despite the Buchanan and Kraemer
doctrines,"0 and later decisions such as Jones v. Alfred H.
Mayer, Co.,"' few blacks have been able to escape from ghet-
tos and move into the "white noose" that surrounds
them."3
If one considers the publicly expressed rationales for public
and private segregation regimes, one can see that the master
narrative of black inferiority explains race discrimination and
housing segregation. For example, in 1910, several southern
cities enacted segregation ordinances to "discourage friction be-
tween the white and Negro races and to keep them from inter-
people moved into the Black Belt than were permitted to leave it. As
overcrowded areas became more overcrowded, the pressure of sheer num-
bers forced some blacks into previously all-white areas. Thus, whereas
blacks were becoming more isolated from the white population generally,
a large number of whites found themselves living in technically 'mixed"
areas. Segregation was not ending. It had merely become time to work
out a new geographical accommodation between the races.
Id.
108. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
109. Id. at 20; see also Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953) (extending the
Shelley doctrine to prohibit contract damages actions against white property owners
who sell to blacks in violation of a racially restrictive covenant).
110. See Higginbotham et al., supra note 102, at 770.
The impact of the due process rationale enunciated in Buchanan on hous-
ing opportunities for black Americans has been critical. If the United
States Supreme Court had not exercised its power to review discriminato-
ry state statutes and city ordinances and declare them unconstitutional,
many southern states and perhaps many other parts of America could be
nearly as destructive of the rights of black Americans in 1990 regarding
equality of opportunity in housing as they were seventy-five years or
more ago. Without the Supreme Court, the plight of black Americans
today concerning urban and suburban housing conditions could be almost
akin to that of black South Africans.
Id.
111. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
112. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 48, at 160-62; Sam Roberts, Shifts in 80's
Failed To Ease Segregation, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 1992, at B1 ("Despite the huge
slfts in New York City's population in the 1980s, blacks and whites-regardless of
their incomes-have remained as segregated as they were when the decade began,
according to a block-by-block analysis of the 1990 census.").
113. See KUSHNER, supra note 5, at 3; see also EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 43,
at 230-31 (describing predominantly white and republican suburbs).
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mingling socially and to some extent commercially." 4 Things
were no different in 1917, for in Buchanan, counsel for the city
of Louisville expressed his rationale for segregated housing:
It is shown by philosophy, experience, and legal decisions, to
say nothing of Divine Writ, that ... the races of the earth
shall preserve their racial integrity by living socially by
themselves. Black neighborhoods are undesirable because
"the shiftless, the improvident, the ignorant and the criminal
carry their moral and economic condition with them wherever
they go."
115
Similarly, in 1927, a Virginia city based its segregation ordi-
nance on miscegenation statutes in order to prohibit blacks from
using residences if such buildings were occupied by persons
whom blacks could not legally marry." After World War II,
these public sentiments did not change, and as blacks migrated
north, the Fair Housing Administration insured housing loans
that enabled whites to flee the urban centers and reside in sub-
urban communities that, explicitly or implicitly, excluded "mem-
bers of other than the Caucasian race.""' Today, as in the
1850s and 1890s, many whites believe that their black neighbors
suppress their homes' fair market values."' As in the years
immediately preceding the Fair Housing Act, whites today ex-
press their feelings about the sanctity of neighborhood puri-
ty"' by burning crosses on blacks' property or brutally assault-
114. MANGUM, supra note 17, at 140.
115. Higginbotham et al., supra note 102 at 854 (citing Brief for Defendant in
Error at 7, 12, Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917) (No. 33)).
116. MANGUM, supra note 17, at 143.
117. See GEORGE B. TINDALL & DAVID E. SI., AMERICA: A NARRATIVE HISTORY
1266-68 (2d ed. 1992); Calnore, supra note 44, at 1510-12.
118. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 48, at 94; see also United States v. Myers,
892 F.2d 642 (7th Cir. 1992)
Myers' parents wanted to sell their home and *'ere concerned that its
value would be impaired if there were blacks living in the neighborhood.
Myers decided to scare the black couple into leaving, and together with
Randall Neal bought two gallons of gasoline at an all-night gas station
and set fire to the [black couple's] car. The black couple took the hint
and moved away.
Id. at 643.
119. See United States v. McInnis, 976 F.2d 1226, 1229 (9th Cir. 1992) (noting that
the defendant had stated that "he did not care to be around 'niggers").
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ing blacks.12 °
In exhibiting such behavior, whites operate on the master
narrative of black inferiority. By attacking blacks, burning their
property, or preventing them from enjoying their property, these
whites are little different from the father in this Article's open-
ing dialogue, who deprived Monroe of his mule-an important
factor in Monroe's personal and economic success. A black
person's house, like Monroe's mule, can be used to increase in-
come, personal choices, and upward mobility. 21 When the fa-
ther killed Monroe's mule, Monroe left the county, just as black
families are often forced out of their homes by race hatred and
violence, perhaps without recouping their valuable investment in
their property. The master narrative of black inferiority thus
operates not only in the manner described in the opening dia-
logue, but also in those cases in which whites deny blacks the
right to enjoy their property. The same is true if whites prevent
blacks from having access to such property.
B. Fair Housing Act, Racial Limits, and Extant Housing
Segregation
1. The Fair Housing Act and the Amendments of 1988
Enacted in 1968, the Fair Housing Act 2 represented an in-
stitutional effort to curb housing discrimination and housing
segregation, two consequences of the master narrative of black
inferiority. Under the Act, Congress prohibited many discrimina-
tory practices that prevented blacks from buying and renting
120. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 6 F.3d 1297, 1297 (8th Cir. 1993) (stating that
the defendant "constructed and buirned a cross on a hill near an apartment complex
in which a number of black families resided"); McInnis, 976 F.2d at 1228 ("McInnis
fired two shots from an 8mm Mauser rifle through the Kellers' home.").
121. See, e.g., Sawada v. Endo, 561 P.2d 1291, 1297 (flaw. 1977).
When a family can afford to own real property, it becomes their single
most important asset. Encumbered as it usually is by a first mort-
gage, . . . it is always available in its entirety for the benefit and use of
the entire family. Loans for education and other emergency expenses, for
example, may be obtained on the security of the marital estate.
Id.
122. Fair Housing Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 81 (codified as amend-
ed at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
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real property'2z with the hope of achieving its broadly support-
ed goals of nondiscrimination and integratin.'24 These goals
were broadly supported for two reasons. First, the Supreme
Court had recently heard arguments for strengthening a simi-
lar statutory provision in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.,"
and later prohibited racial discrimination in the sale of real
property. 6 Second, after the reaction to Martin Luther King
Jr.'s assassination threatened urban markets and white sub-
urbs, "' 7 Congress impulsively sought a legislative vehicle for
"racial conciliation."" To alleviate the stress, poverty, hope-
lessness, and violence of black urban life, 9 the 1968 Fair
Housing Act provided for broad remedial measures. 3 ° Lastly,
federal courts gave this Act a "broad," "inclusive," and "gener-
123. See id.; Katherine G. Steans, Countering Implicit Discrimination in Real Es-
tate Advertisements: A Call for the Issuance of Human Model Injunctions, 88 Nw. U.
L. REV. 1200, 1205-08 (1994).
124. See Edward W. Brooke et al., Non-Discrimination in the Sale or Rental of Real
Property: Comments on Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. and Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1968, 22 VAND. L. REV. 455, 456-57 (1969).
125. See 392 U.S. 409 (1968) (holding that 42 U.S.C. § 1982 lrohibited private and
public discrimination in the sale or rental of real property).
126. Id. at 413.
127. See GLASGOW, supra note 68, -at 7, 105-24 (discussing the Watts riots);
KERNER COMMISSION, supra note 71, at 75-82 (discussing a riot that occurred in
Plainfield, New Jersey, a community in which 30% of the residents were black).
128. See KUSHNER, supra note 5, at 3; Ware, supra note 95, at 74 ("Dr. Martin
Luther King, Jr.'s assassination on April 4, 1968, and the resulting wide-spread civil
unrest, provided the final impetus needed to push H.R. 2516 out of the House Rules
Committee."). During the final debate, a member of the House argued that
the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr., has given us a tragic re-
minder of the urgency for federal protection of the exercise of civil
rights .... A national fair housing act ... is required unless the ex-
plosive concentration of Negroes in the urban ghettos is to continue. The
hour is late. If Congress delays, it may be writing the death warrant of
racial conciliation.
Id. (citing 114 CONG. REC. H9589 (daily ed. Apr. 10, 1968) (statement of Rep.
Ryan)).
129. MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 48, at 83 ("Discrimination in employment ex-
acerbated black poverty and limited the economic potential for integration, and black
residential mobility was systematically blocked by pervasive discrimination and white
avoidance of neighborhoods containing blacks.").
130. Fair Housing Act of 1968 § 810, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 81, 85-86 (codi-
fied as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3610-3613, 3616a (1988 & Supp. V 1993)). But see
DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED 152-53 (1991) (describing court-approved
ceilings on the number of minorities allowed to live in a residential area).
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ous construction." 3'
The 1968 Act prohibited discrimination and imposed liability
on those discriminating against citizens seeking to buy or rent
housing based on their race, color, religion, or national ori-
gin.132 Although the Act exempted any single family house that
was sold or rented by its owner," it specifically provided in
relevant part that it was unlawful:
(a) To refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide
offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or
otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any per-
son because of race, color, religion, or national origin.
(b) To discriminate against any person in the terms, condi-
tions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the
provision of services or facilities in connection therewith,
because of race, color, religion, or national origin.
(c) To make, print, or publish, or cause to be made, print-
ed, or published any notice, statement, or advertisement,
with respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling that indicates
any preference, limitation, or discrimination based on race,
color, religion, or national origin, or an intention to make any
such preferences, limitation, or discrimination. 84
Unfortunately, federal efforts to eliminate these vestiges of
the master narrative of black inferiority failed under the 1968
Act. Since 1968, blacks continue to face housing discrimination
and live in segregated communities. Of course, some blacks
escaped the suffocating poverty and abysmal city services by
relocating to more racially integrated communities. These minor
successes notwithstanding, the master narrative of black inferi-
ority, which had initially underwritten racial oppression and
isolation, continued basically unabated." As one commentator
131. See, e.g., United States v. Gilbert, 813 F.2d 1523, 1525 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 860 (1987).
132. Fair Housing Act of 1968 § 804, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 81, 83 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1988)). The Act now includes sex, familial status,
and, in some instances, handicap within this class.
133. Fair Housing Act of 1968 § 803(b)(1), 82 Stat. at 82-83 (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b)(1) (1988)).
134. Fair Housing Act of 1968 § 804(a)-(c), 82 Stat. at 83 (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. § 3604(a)-(c) (1988)).
135. See James A. Kushner, Apartheid in America: An Historical and Legal
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explained, "[alithough an increasing number of blacks are pres-
ent in America's suburbs and predominantly white neighbor-
hoods, the stark pattern of racial residential segregation has
worsened. America is more segregated-physically separated by
race-today than at any time in its history."136
In light of the continuing effects of the master narrative of
black inferiority, Congress enacted the Fair Housing Amend-
ments Act of 1988."' Congress intended these amendments
to strengthen the original Act's enforcement arm and broaden
its remedial scope.' Under the 1988 Amendments, it is un-
lawful:
(d) To represent to any person because of race, color, reli-
gion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin that
any dwelling is not available for inspection, sale, or rental
when such dwelling is in fact so available.
(e) For profit, to induce, or attempt to induce any person to
sell or rent any dwelling by representations regarding the
entry or prospective entry into the neighborhood of a person
or persons of a particular race, color, religion, sex, handicap,
familial status, or national origin.'
In addition to these statutory amendments, Congress combat-
ted the master narrative of black inferiority by placing in the
Act three mechanisms to achieve the-goals of nondiscrimination
and integration. First, Congress granted the United States De-
partment of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) the power
Analysis of Contemporary Racial Residential Segregation in the United States, 22
How. L.J. 547, 547 (1979) ("We live in a divided nation. In an examination of deseg-
regation, perhaps the only certainty is that residential segregation is pervasive and
the degree of separation is increasing.").
136. James A. Kushner, The Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988: The Second
Generation of Fair Housing, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1049, 1050 (1989).
137. Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-340, 102 Stat. 1619
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
138. See Stearns, supra note 123, at 1206. The Fair Housing Amendments of 1988
broadened the FHA in three ways: first, they strengthened the Act by permitting
private litigants to seek enforcement through the courts, § 813, 102 Stat. at 1633-34
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 3613 (1988)); second, they protected the handi-
capped, § 804, 102 Stat. at 1620-22 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 3604
(1988)); and third, they prohibited discrimination based on familial status, § 804, 102
Stat. at 1620-22 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1988)).
139. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(d)-(e) (1988).
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to enforce the Act administratively.14 ° Second, the Act empow-
ered the United States Attorney General to initiate action to
eradicate discriminatory "pattern[s] and practice[s]" and to en-
force HUD's conciliation agreements,' Third, the 1988
Amendments provided private citizens with the statutory right
to bring civil actions against the Act's violators. This latter
provision was not necessarily new, for
[iut is generally agreed that the original Fair Housing Act
was "designed to rely primarily on private enforcement [to
achieve its goals]." But the statutory restrictions on remedies
severely hampered private enforcement under the original
Act. Under the original Private Enforcement Provision, a
plaintiff who established a violation of the Act and proved
that he suffered injury as a result of that violation could
recover compensatory damages, but punitive damages were
limited to $1,000, and attorneys fees were recoverable only if
the plaintiff showed financial need. Such limited remedies
proved inadequate incentives for plaintiffs facing the finan-
cial and emotional toll of filing a privately initiated fair
housing suit. Indeed, those limited remedies have been iden-
tified as "the primary reasons that [the original] Title VIII
was not effective in eradicating housing discrimination."43
To eliminate this remedial limitation, Congress in 1988 gave
greater incentive to private parties to enforce the Act through
civil action. With this new incentive, private parties can more
effectively attack housing discrimination and segregation. To-
ward this end, private parties are allowed to bring an action not
within 180 days, but within two years of the discriminatory act.
Second, aggrieved citizens can now obtain punitive awards and
appropriately chasten offending parties. Lastly, the prevailing
plaintiff can seek attorney fees without satisfying a financial
needs test. Without the original Act's remedial barriers, a court
140. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3610, 3612 (1988); HUD ex rel. Herron v. Blackwell, 908 F.2d
864 (11th Cir. 1990) (enforcing HUD's administrative disposition of Title VIII com-
plaint). See generally Kushner, supra note 136 (discussing HUD's administrative
enforcement powers).
141. 42 U.S.C. § 3614.
142. 42 U.S.C. § 3613.
143. Stearns, supra note 123, at 1208-09 (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
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can now grant not only the appropriate amount of compensatory
and punitive damages, but also attorney fees and injunctive
relief."4 Despite the possibility of government action, the
"main generating force [behind enforcement of the Act] must be
private suits," if the Act's priorities of nondiscrimination and
integration are going to be advanced.'45
2. Racial Limits and Extant Housing Segregation
Despite the enactment of the original Act and the 1988
amendments, which strengthened the national goals of nondis-
crimination and integration, the master narrative of black inferi-
ority continues to play a significant role in excluding blacks from
all-white and predominantly white communities. 46 Blacks con-
tinue to suffer the trauma of hostile physical and psychological
separation 47 and the reinforcement of the view that black self-
conception and identity are inferior to that of whites. More-
over, blacks continue to live under America's market-driven,
apartheid-like housing policies. By strengthening the private
enforcement provision of the Act without recognizing the influ-
ence of the master narrative of black inferiority on America's
racist culture, Congress sent the message that racial discrimina-
tion and housing segregation are "problem[s] ... of individual
access rather than... illegal activity aimed at a segment of
society."'
144. See 42 U.S.C. § 3613; Stearns, supra note 123, at 1208-09.
145. Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins., 409 U.S. 205, 211 (1972); see Robert G.
Schwemm, Private Enforcement and the Fair Housing Act, 6 YALE L. & POLY REV.
375, 378 (1988).
146. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 48, at 102-04.
147. See Brooke et al., supra note 124, at 456.
148. See Armstrong, supra note 60, at 909.
149. Id. at 912.
Despite the increased incentives to initiat[e] a private action under the
amended Act, serious obstacles remain. First, victims often do not realize
that they are being discriminated against, especially if the method of
discrimination is more subtle than an outright or hostile refusal to sell
or rent. Second, even if the victims are aware that they have been dis-
criminated against, they may be unwilling to subject themselves to the
financial and emotional toll that a trial would inevitably entail. Third,
discrimination in the housing market may be extremely difficult to prove,
since it is a case-specific area of law with virtually no statistical evidence
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Congress and the federal courts must acknowledge that the
master narrative of black inferiority is subtle and sophisticated,
not only because racist culture operates almost invisibly,15 ° but
also because people who are not openly racist discriminate with-
out intent. 51 At this level, the master narrative of black inferi-
ority coexists with the Fair Housing Act.
In addition to the manner in which racism operates invisibly
and pervasively, the master narrative of black inferiority sus-
tains housing segregation because whites explicitly prefer to live
with other whites and implicitly assume that racial discrimina-
tion can maintain "a racially segmented housing market."'
5 2
Some commentators argue:
Whites can only avoid co-residence with blacks if mecha-
nisms exist to keep blacks out of most white neighborhoods.
They can only flee a neighborhood where blacks have entered
if there are other all-white areas to go to, and this escape will
only be successful if blacks are unlikely to follow. Some meth-
od must exist, therefore, to limit black entry to a few neigh-
borhoods and to preserve racial homogeneity in the rest.
Although white prejudice is a necessary precondition for the
on which to rely. Thus, the seemingly impossible burden of proof may
discourage victims of housing discrimination from bringing suit.
Stearns, supra note 123, at 1211 n.43.
150. See GOLDBERG, supra note 63, at 149.
In the seeming informalities of its modes, literary and cultural pro-
duction is particularly well-placed to mold, circumscribe, and stamp
racialized identity, since racial significations are deeply implicit in the
signs employed and employable. Racialized connotations are embedded in
the locus of ordinary social meanings that cultural expression reflects in
the various space-time contexts of modernity. Knowledge, in particular
knowledge of and about the social, is not produced in a vacuum.
Knowledge producers are set in social milieus. The political economy and
culture of their productive practices act upon the categories employed,
and so they inform the knowledge being produced. By furnishing assump-
tions, values, and goals, this economy and culture frame the terms of the
epistemological project. Once produced, the terms of articulation set their
users' outlooks. The categories that now fashion content of the known
constrain how people in the social order at hand think about things.
Epistemological 'foundations,' then, are at the heart of the constitution of
social power.
Id. (citations omitted).
151. See Lawrence, supra note 12, at 318; Oppenheimer, supra note 12, at 900-17.
152. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 48, at 97.
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perpetuation of segregation, it is insufficient to maintain the
residential color line; active discrimination against blacks
must occur also."'
The master narrative of black inferiority thus continues to
promote and sustain racial discrimination and housing segrega-
tion, even though a clear congressional and constitutional man-
date exists to remedy this problem. If the environment that is
the basis for the master narrative of black inferiority is a con-
stitutional one,"M then a broadly remedial act cannot eradicate
housing segregation within those very same, albeit somewhat
differently interpreted, 55 constitutional boundaries. The mas-
ter narrative of black inferiority thrived within a constitutional
framework, and an Act that is bound by that framework cannot
end the violence, either in dominant white images or in physical
153. Id.
154. See, e.g., Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435 (1970) (refusing to find a violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment when a court determined that a testator who conveyed
land for the creation of a whites-only park would rather have had the trust termi-
nated than the park integrated); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (finding
separate but equal public accommodations beyond the reach of .the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883)
(denying Congress the power under the Civil Rights Act of 1866 to regulate private
discrimination); Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873) (casting no
meaning on the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment);
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856) (demonstrating that blacks
have no rights that a white man is bound to respect).
155. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (holding that the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 does not preclude the use of reasonable testing procedures
as a condition of employment); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968)
(relying on 42 U.S.C. § 1982, originally adopted as part of Civil Rights Act of 1866,
to invalidate private racial discrimination in housing); Heart of Atlanta Motel v.
United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (finding that Congress may constitutionally use
Commerce Clause as basis of civil rights enforcement); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S.
249 (1953) (extending Shelley doctrine to prevent contract damages actions against
whites who sell to blacks in violation of racially restrictive covenants); Shelley v.
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (holding that private agreements to exclude persons of
certain races from the use of real estate for residential purposes do not violate the
Fourteenth Amendment, but state enforcement of these agreements does); Corrigan
v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323 (1926) (asserting that the Fifth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth
Amendments do not prohibit private owners from covenanting not to sell to any
person of negro blood); Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917) (invalidating ordi-
nance preventing blacks from occupying homes in predominantly white neighbor-
hoods); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879) (invalidating state law pro-
hibiting blacks from serving on juries).
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assault,'56 that attends such a master narrative.57
During the 1970s, despite the presence of this narrative,
blacks did make some gains; those with the financial wherewith-
al to do so left the urban ghettos and migrated to the sub-
urbs. 5 ' In effect, blacks broke down the ghetto/suburb dichoto-
my and altered the spatial inequality59 that was borne in the
1890s and cemented after World War II.16° Conceptually, inte-
gration was working. As blacks escaped the ghetto, white
suburbanization also declined.' 6'
At the same time, the migration of blacks from south to north
decelerated and reversed, and for the first time since the
Civil War, the south experienced a net in-migration of blacks.
Between 1970 and 1980, the northeast and the midwest to-
gether lost some 342,000 black migrants while the south
gained 209,000 black entrants. The drying up of this tradi-
tional south-to-north migration stream eliminated a key sup-
ply-side factor that had contributed to ghetto formation and
white racial hostility for a hundred years.62
Furthermore, improving socio-economic conditions among blacks
156. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 48, at 97. Massey and Denton point out
that whites have defended the color line traditionally with violence. As physical
violence has declined, whites still use violence to insulate blacks within ghetto walls.
Because physical violence has a downside, whites have "shifted tactics to adopt less
overt and more socially acceptable ways of defending the color line." Id. Accordingly,
the absence of overt discrimination does not mean that exclusionary prac-
tices have ended, however, rather, the character of discrimination has
changed. Black homeseekers now face a more subtle process of exclusion.
Rather than encountering "white only" signs, they face a covert series of
barriers. Instead of being greeted with the derisive rejection "no niggers
allowed," they are met by a realtor with a smiling face who, through a
series of ruses, lies, and deceptions, makes it hard for them to learn
about, inspect, rent, or purchase homes in white neighborhoods.
Id.
157. See BELL, supra note 130, at 151-53; KUSHNER, supra note 5, at 3; Note, Dis-
crimination in Employment and in Housing: Private Enforcement Provisions of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 1968, 82 HARV. L. REV. 834, 838, 848 (1969).
158. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 48, at 61; Ware, supra note 95, at 62.
159. See Calmore, supra note 44, at 1492-1501.
160. See Joseph B. Robinson, Fair Housing Legislation in the City and State of
New York, in THE POLITICS OF FAIR-HOUSING LEGISLATION: STATE AND LOCAL CASES
27 (Lynn W. Eley & Thomas W. Casstevens eds., 1968).
161. MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 48, at 60.
162. Id. (citations omitted).
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bolstered the Act's goal of integration. With steady urban em-
ployment, blacks began to integrate the suburbs. Until the 1973
recession, "black income levels were rising and levels of racial
discrimination were falling. In 1973 the rate of black poverty
reached its lowest level in U.S. history."1 3 Despite the persis-
tence of the master narrative, the confluence of declining racial
discrimination and black social and economic mobility produced
the sanguine hope that, within constitutional limits, the Act
would end housing segregation."
Despite the relative successes in the years immediately after
Congress passed the Fair Housing Act, housing segregation and
racial isolation remained extant because, as Derrick Bell has
noted, "[r]acial policy is the culmination of thousands of...
individual practices."'65 During the 1970s, segregation persist-
ed in both urban and suburban areas, and the ghetto gave birth
to the permanent black underclass.'66 If black upward econom-
ic mobility and declining racial discrimination advanced the
Act's integration goals, then the permanence of housing segrega-
tion can be attributed only to race.
Through the Fair Housing Act, Congress "intended 'to provide,
within constitutional limitations, for fair housing throughout the
United States.""67 Race and constitutional limitations are,
however, interdependent; despite the presence of strong constitu-
tional jurisprudence, blacks have been unable to use the Act to
eradicate housing segregation. Several factors explain extant
housing segregation, all of which are directly or indirectly linked
to the master narrative of black inferiority. If the central factor
is race, then its subsets are housing markets that prefer race
discrimination to profit taking, and hypersegregation and isola-
tion in suburban communities to racial integration.
First, resistant, extant housing segregation continues to belie
black financial wherewithal. 6 ' The rising income levels of
163. Id. at 61 (citations omitted).
164. Id.
165. BELL, supra note 49, at 7.
166. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 48, at 61, 73-74.
167. United States v. Gilbert, 813 F.2d 1523, 1526 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
860 (1987).
168. Race vs. Income in Housing Discrimination, MINORrrY MARKETS ALERT (E.P.M.
105
106 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:69
blacks thus do not, and have not, undermined housing segrega-
tion,169 which cannot be explained by housing market informa-
tion deficits. 70 Whether blacks lived in the North or South, the
Communications), Sept. 1992.
Race and not income seems to be the most important factor in continuing
housing segregation in the city. Currently, over half of [New York City's]
Blacks live in block groups in which they constitute 75[% or more] of the
population. But Blacks studied are segregated at about the same rates,
whether- they are above or below the poverty line.
Id.
169. MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 48, at 85.
170. Id. at 87. One thing that explains the concerted and systematic effort to ex-
clude blacks, affluent or poor, is educational elitism, whereby whites seek to guaran-
tee their children an edge in competing with the "Other"-blacks. See Nancy Folbre,
The Bottom Line: Business to the Rescue?, 255 NATION 281 (1992).
The shifting demographics of race, age and family structure make
privatization more attractive to the largely white, suburban and older
Americans who run or invest in corporations. Public education in this
country used to be virtually private, because local communities could
focus their education spending on their own children and exclude those of
a different ethnic or racial background. That remained true even after
Brown v. Board of Education, the 1954 Supreme Court decision overturn-
ing segregation in schools, because of the lethal combination of residential
housing segregation and school budgets based.on local property taxes.
Id. at 282. Limited employment opportunities are another reason, why whites seek a
competitive edge on blacks. As corporations restructure in times of economic contrac-
tion, especially due to the recent intensification of the internationalization of the
United States economy, limited economic opportunities are further complicated when
individual racism and the master narrative of black inferiority effectively render
blacks socially and economically irrelevant. See Sara McLafferty & Valerie Preston,
Spatial Mismatch and Labor Market Segmentation for African-American and Latina
Women, 68 ECON. GEOGRAPHY 406, 406 (1992) ("Mhe economic and social
marginalization of African-Americans and Latinos in inner cities [are] rooted in
the broader process of economic restructuring. The shifi from a goods-producing to
an information- and service-producing economy has dramatically reduced job op-
portunities for minorities, particularly minority men, who historically found work
in manufacturing.").
Blacks can overcome some of-the disparities in labor market segmentation by
gaining access to all-white or predominantly white communities, primarily because
these communities have better schools and services. Blacks can gain this access under
the FHA. When a few blacks locate in these communities, they encounter some whites
who consciously reject them and others who unconsciously resist them. The result is
not only isolation, but also physical or symbolic violence, because whites probably feel
that the last remaining vestiges of their supposedly privileged status-all-white com-
munities-have been befouled and that any opportunities derived from this privilege
have been lost. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 48, at 94 ("Given that a home is
widely viewed as a symbol of a person's worth, these views imply that whites perceive
blacks to be a direct threat to their social status.") (citations omitted).
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pattern of housing segregation remained relatively the same
among affluent and poor blacks."
Among northern metropolitan areas, for example, blacks, no
matter what their income, remain very highly segregated from
whites. As of 1980, black families earning under $2,500 per
year experienced an average segregation index of 86 [out of
100], whereas those earning more than $50,000 had an aver-
age score of 83; .... This pattern of constant, high segregation
was replicated in virtually all northern urban areas."2
Although southern areas generally evinced lower levels of
racial segregation, the basic pattern by income was the same:
rising economic status had little or no effect on the level of
segregation that blacks experienced. On average, segregation
moved from 74 in the lowest income category to 73 in the
highest, with a value of 67 in between. Segregation was par-
ticularly high and resistant to change in Atlanta, Baltimore,
Dallas, Miami, and Tampa; but even in southern cities with
relatively low levels of segregation, there was little evidence
of a meaningful differential by income: the poorest blacks in
Birmingham, Alabama, displayed a segregation index of 46,
whereas the most affluent black families had a segregation
index of 45.''
Blacks, whether poor or affluent, thus failed to break down
racially discriminatory barriers, thereby reinforcing segregated
housing patterns. Furthermore, blacks appeared to have suffi-
cient housing market information to identify relocation opportu-
nities.' 4 A housing market information deficit thus cannot ex-
plain extant housing segregation. This conclusion is strength-
ened by the work of Reynolds Farley in Detroit. "He found that
blacks were quite knowledgeable about housing costs throughout
the metropolitan area, even in distant white suburbs, and were
well aware that they could afford to live outside the ghetto.
Whatever was keeping affluent blacks out of white areas, it was
not ignorance." '
171. MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 48, at 86-87.
172. Id. at 85.
173. Id. at 87.
174. Id.
175. Id.
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Black suburbanization did not achieve integration under the
Act, even though some blacks were able to escape from urban
ghettos or from racially segregated urban communities. Housing
segregation remained extant during the 1970s, despite socio-
economic factors that had increased the likelihood that the Act's
goal of integration would be achieved. Instead, blacks became
geographically isolated within the cities."6
Second, despite the scope of extant housing segregation under
the aegis of the Act, the extent of racial segregation remains
understated because it does not include the black underclass,
hypersegregation, and isolation within suburban communities.
The creation of the black underclass trapped blacks in a cycle of
poverty and despair from which few have escaped. 7 7 When
their degree of entrapment is further compounded by racial
isolation, blacks are not just segregated, but
hypersegregated." 8 Hypersegregation contains five distinctive
dimensions:
[Bilacks may be distributed so that they are overrepresented
in some areas and underrepresented in others, leading to
different degrees of unevenness; [second,] they may also be
distributed so that their racial isolation is ensured by virtue
of rarely sharing a neighborhood with whites.... [Third,]
black neighborhoods may be tightly clustered to form one
large contiguous enclave or scattered about in checkerboard
fashion; [fourth,] they may be concentrated within a very
small area or settled sparsely throughout the urban environ-
ment. Finally, they may be spatially centralized around the
urban core or spread out along the periphery.7"
This point is a very troubling one. More than mere segrega-
tion, blacks are experiencing at least four of the five dimen-
176. See id. at 73-74; see also Kushner, supra note 136, at 1052; Ivan C. Smith,
Note, Discriminatory Use of Models in Housing Advertisement: The Ordinary Black
Reader Standard, 54 OHio ST. L.J. 1521, 1521 (1993) (echoing Kushner and suggest-
ing that "Congress' goal in enacting the FHA, ending patterns of housing segregation
has, largely gone unrealized").
177. See CLARK, supra note 76, at 11-21; GLASGOW, supra note 68, at 71-85;
MAssEY & DENTON, supra note 48, at 60-74.
178. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 48, at 74-78.
179. Id. at 74.
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sions of hypersegregation. As a consequence, the effect of such
isolation and segregation intensifies. This "multidimensional
layering of segregation ... understate[s] its real severity in
American society."
180
Despite its lofty legislative goal, the Act has not ended hous-
ing discrimination and its malignant cousin, housing segrega-
tion. The woeful social tale of two cities firmly squeezes the
hearts of blacks and barely rings the tin ears of whites. Whereas
the Act can cope with most individual acts or patterns of hous-
ing discrimination, it is absolutely incapable of specifically tar-
geting the underlying social forces that persist in the making
and remaking of urban ghettos. Under the Act, individual perpe-
trators can and are punished. Nonetheless, success in this area
has not weakened racial discrimination in housing consumption.
Social conditions under the Act have remained a mystery,
though they ought not. Simply put, the Act focuses on individual
crimes while failing to note that the context from which these
discriminatory acts arise has been ignored legislatively, judicial-
ly, and prosecutorially.' 8 ' If Congress were to turn its remedial
attention to these social conditions, it would find that race ha-
tred seethes because people have been inculcated in a milieu of
race conscious social development. Moreover, Congress would
find that race hatred and housing discrimination depend on the
master narrative of black inferiority, an oft told story that has
fixed firmly and indelibly in the white mind what it means to be
black in America.'82 The Act's blindness to the master narra-
tive is the crucible that explains not only why housing segrega-
tion persists, but also why the Act fails. Because Congress has
failed to accept that whites hate and fear blacks, that race ha-
tred explains housing segregation, and that the master narrative
of black inferiority prevents a real end to this social phenome-
non, many cities remain as segregated today as they were dur-
ing America's early history.
180. Id.
181. See Robinson, supra note 62, at 610-12.
182. See generally FREDRICKSON, supra note 2, at 321 (listing racist propositions
that were almost universally recognized in the nineteenth century).
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III. MASTER NARRATIVE OF BLACK INFERIORITY: INTERSECTION
OF DOMINANT WHITE IMAGES AND THE VIOLENCE OF
NEIGHBORHOOD PURITY
The Fair Housing Act has failed to end housing segregation.
After almost thirty years, the United States is still a highly
segregated nation.'83 Perhaps one of the most important rea-
sons for this failure is that the Act cannot end what its drafters
were ill-prepared to acknowledge-white Americans are pro-
foundly racist and harbor an unacknowledged commitment in
whole or in part to some notion of white supremacy." Two ob-
servations support this argument. First, some white Americans
183. See Kushner, supra note 136, at 1061.
184. See Oppenheimer, supra note 12, at" 904-14. Psychological experiments
attempt to observe white subjects in an interracial situation where their
conduct, if uninfluenced by racism, would be expected to be similar to
their conduct with other whites. The results present strong evidence that
the reduction in racist views expressed in surveys does not foretell a
corresponding reduction in racist behavior.
Id. at 911. Professor Oppenheimer also described, " helping behavior studies,' in
which white subjects were faced with people (half of whom were white, half of whom
were black) posing as needing assistance." Id. He noted that after analyzing thirty
helping behavior studies, Faye Crosby concluded that "in 40% of the studies, white
subjects showed discriminatory behavior against blacks." Id. at 912 (citing Faye
Crosby et al., Recent Unobtrusive Studies of Black and White Discrimination and
Prejudice: A Literature Review, 87 PSYCHOL. BULL. 546 (1980)). Crosby's analysis,
however, has been challenged by Lauren G. Wispe. Oppenheimer noted that:
[h]igh as it is, this 40% measure of discrimination may be understat-
ed due to the social scientists' conservative analysis of what constitutes
nondiscrimination. For example, Wispe concluded that the white subjects
showed no discrimination in their willingness to help the shoppers whose
bags broke. However, in her analysis of the Wispe shopping bag experi-
ment, Crosby notes, while whites and blacks were offered assistance in
equal numbers, the amount of assistance offered was not equal. Rather,
63% of the time that white subjects were aiding white women, the sub-
jects gave complete help, picking up all of the groceries. But 70% of the
time white subjects helped black women, they gave only perfunctory help,
picking up only a few packages. When complete help and perfunctory
help are distinguished, Wispe's study, which concludes that there was no
showing of racial differences in helping behavior, demonstrates that
whites are exactly twice as likely to help other whites as they are Afri-
can Americans.
Id. at 912 (citing Lauren G. Wispe & Harold B. Freshley, Race, Sex, and Sympathet-
ic Helping Behavior. The Broken Bag Caper, 17 J. PERSONALITY & SoC. PSYCHOL. 59
(1971)).
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are openly hostile to blacks, and these whites rationalize their
conduct through the usual and seemingly endless stereotypes
about blacks." Second, most white Americans are uncon-
sciously hostile to blacks.'86 These whites, many of whom
might fashion themselves as liberals, continue to promote the
underlying message of the master narrative of black inferiori-
ty,87 while wishing that America was not prejudiced against
185. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 48, at 88-96.
White apprehensions about racial mixing are associated with the
belief that having black neighbors undermines property values and re-
duces neighborhood safety. According to the Newsday poll, 58% of Long
Island's whites believe that property values fall once blacks enter a
neighborhood (in fact, evidence suggests the opposite, at least during the
transition process). Likewise, among whites in Detroit who said they
would leave if blacks moved into their neighborhoods, 40% believed that
property values would decrease after black entry, and 17% believed that
the crime rate would rise.
Id. at 94 (citations omitted).
186. See generally Lawrence, supra note 12 (challenging the intention-
al/unintentional racial discrimination dichotomy).
187. See Oppenheimer, supra note 12, at 909-11.
Although the 1990 NORC survey, and earlier surveys on implemen-
tation of civil rights laws, disclose an extremely high level of white rac-
ism, one obvious problem with survey data is the risk that the respon-
dents are not being truthful in their answers. As high as the numbers
are, the disparity between the questions on principle and those on imple-
mentation suggests that survey results generally may underestimate the
true level of white racism because of the concern by respondents not to
appear racist. If overt racism is socially unacceptable behavior, persons
being surveyed, even anonymously, may be reluctant to reveal their true
beliefs. This is borne out by a series of experiments conducted in the
1970s in which white subjects were polled regarding their views on Afri-
can Americans, with half hooked up to a device (a "bogus pipeline") that
was described as a sophisticated lie detector. The subjects attached to the
bogus pipeline admitted holding far more negative stereotypes than did
those merely asked to rate racial characteristics. For example, Sigall and
Page describe the subjects hooked up to the device as describing African
Americans as less "honest" and "intelligent" and more "lazy," "stupid,"
and "physically dirty" than did those subject not hooked up to the bogus
pipeline. (Both groups of whites, those hooked up and those not hooked
up to the machine, rated African Americans negatively as compared to
whites.) Allen demonstrated that whites who had .been rated as "unpreju-
diced" in a paper test on racial attitudes showed a significant reduction
of expressed admiration of black public figures when hooked up to the
bogus pipeline. Carver's study is particularly relevant to employment
discrimination. The subjects were asked to characterize a fellow student
based on a transcript of an interview. The transcripts were identical,
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blacks. 8 ' In their most benign form, unconscious racists negli-
gently discriminate 9 by what they actively do and passively
permit. In either case, the discrimination is equally harmful.
Historically, the United States has always operated between
these tensions. Some whites consciously promote the master
narrative of black inferiority, whereas other whites unconscious-
ly endorse it.' Within our western liberal tradition, this kind
of tension is resolved not by seeking the social etiology of white
supremacy, which can be viewed as a disease,'9 ' but by seeking
to promote mutual tolerance.'92 This approach is flawed, how-
ever, because although
[1liberals may pride themselves in their ability to tolerate
others . . . it is only after the other has been redescribed
as oneself that the liberal is able to be "sensitive" to the
question of cruelty and humiliation. This act of
save that half identified the interviewee as African American. Those not
hooked up to the bogus pipeline actually gave the black student a higher
rating than the student whose race was not identified, but those persuad-
ed by the operation of the machine that their "true feelings" were being
measured, rated the black student significantly lower than the other.
These results suggest a high level of dissembling by many survey partici-
pants, and raise the question of whether even the data revealed in the
more subtle 1990 NORC survey understate the true level of white rac-
ism.
Id. (citations omitted).
188. See BELL HOOKS, BLACK LOOKS: RACE AND REPRESENTATION (1992).
189. See Oppenheimer, supra note 12, at 900-17 (discussing unconscious discrim-
ination).
190. See generally Lawrence, supra note 12, at 328-44 (exploring the relationship
between the unconscious and racially discriminatory practices); Oppenheimer, supra
note 12, at 900-17 (arguing that discrimination is more closely analogous to negli-
gent conduct than to intentional conduct).
191. See THOMAS & SILLEN, supra note 12, at 112-21.
In explaining the origin and meaning of racism, it has become ritualistic
to invoke psychiatric concepts. The roots of prejudice are sought in the
"sick personality" or the "sick white psyche." Many authors speak of
frustration-aggression projection, anxiety, and guilt. Such terms suggest
that racism necessarily reflects psychopathology. It is often argued that a
mentally normal person cannot be racist, and that a racist cannot be a
mentally normal person. Just as Hitler was characterized as a madman
and the Germans as a paranoid nation, so the white racists in American
society are described in terms of psychological aberrations.
Id. at 112.
192. See Robinson, supra note 62, at 664-67.
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redescription is still an attempt to appropriate others, only
here it is made to sound as if it were a generous act. It is
an attempt to make an act of consumption appear to be an
act of acknowledgement.193
Mutual tolerance never singularly attains mutual recognition
because legislation is targeted at identifiable violators, not at
unquantifiable social conditions.'94 Consequently, if the FHA
focuses only on persons who violate its strictures, then it is re-
stricted in scope because the master narrative of black inferiori-
ty operates at both conscious and unconscious levels.
The Act has failed on two counts. First, although many whites
are openly hostile and violent toward blacks who wish to move
into all-white neighborhoods,'95 the Act has failed to curtail
that explicit conduct. Second, to the extent that much of what
happens in the housing market today is subtly, unconsciously,
and negligently discriminatory, the Act has failed because it
cannot reach conduct beyond its constitutional boundaries. 9 ' If
the Act cannot reach the unconscious conduct that has as its
background the master narrative of black inferiority, then the
Act not only fails in a narrow enforcement context but also falls
decidedly short of eradicating housing segregation generally.
Within the context of housing segregation, the master narra-
tive of black inferiority subtly influences the advertising of hous-
es or subdivisions. Under the Act, discriminatory advertising is
prohibited. Courts, however, may be unable to identify whether
an advertisement violates the Act when the advertisement's
sublimal message operates at very unconscious levels.9 7 One
193. HOOKS, supra note 188, at 13 (citation omitted).
194. See Freeman, supra note 60, at 98-99.
195.- See, e.g., United States v. Gilbert, 884 F.2d 454 (9th Cir.) (affirming conviction
of white supremacist for threatening to use force against local adoption agency that
placed minority children with white families), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 860 (1989).
196. See, e.g., United States v. Hayward, 6 F.3d 1241, 1249-52 (7th Cir. 1993)
(discussing defendants' argument that their convictions under § 3631(b) were uncon-
stitutional because cross burning is expressive conduct protected under the First
Amendment).
197. See, e.g., Housing Opportunities Made Equal, Inc. (HOME) v. Cincinnati En-
quirer, Inc., 943 F.2d 644, 648-49 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding that a housing advertise-
ment featuring only white models was not a discriminatory message in violation of
the FHA); see Oppenheimer, supra note 12, at 903.
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might argue that when an advertisement is that subtle, a court
cannot impose liability on an alleged violator because people do
not receive the racist message and the violator will thus have no
guide to avoiding costly future litigation.9 ' This argument is
the gravamen of the problem.'99 Professor Lawrence under-
stood this difficulty when he wrote that "most of us are unaware
of our racism.... In other words, a large part of the behavior
that produces racial discrimination is influenced by unconscious
racial motivation."00 Later, Professor Oppenheimer, in extend-
ing the Lawrence thesis to employment discrimination, also rec-
ognized this difficulty when he posited that "[i]f whites are fre-
quently unaware of their own racism, a theory of employment
discrimination that focuses on an intent to discriminate provides
no remedy for most discrimination." '°' Even though broad en-
forcement of section 3604(c) specifically,2 ' and civil rights laws
Given the wide variance between expressions of overt racist principles
and evidence of racist behavior, it appears either that huge numbers of
whites are falsely denying their consciously held racist beliefs, or that
many acts of racist behavior are motivated by unconscious, rather than
intentional, racism. If much white racist behavior is unconscious, a theory
that tests only for intentional discrimination necessarily misses its mark
much of the time.
Id.
198. See 24 CF.R. §§ 109.25(c), 109.30(b) (1994).
Human models ... may not be used to indicate exclusiveness be-
cause of race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national
origin. If models are used . . . the models should be clearly definable as
reasonably representing majority and minority groups ... . Models, if
used, should . . . indicate . . . that the housing is open to all without
regard to race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national
origin ....
§ 109.30(b). For additional discussion on this point, see HOME, 943 F.2d at 647.
199. See Oppenheimer, supra note 12, at 903.
Although the surveys show that the percentage of whites openly support-
ing discrimination against African Americans has dropped considerably,
surveys on the implementation of civil rights, and more sophisticated
surveys attempting to measure white stereotypes about African Ameri-
cans, demonstrate extremely high levels of covert racism. These surveys
support the view that overt racism has lost favor socially, but racist atti-
tudes lie close beneath the surface of our society.
Id.
200. Lawrence, supra note 12, at 322.
201. Oppenheimer, supra note 12, at 916. See generally id. at 967-72 (discussing
theory of negligent discrimination).
202. See Ragin v. New York Times Co., 923 F.2d 995, 999 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
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generally,"3 raises thorny First Amendment issues, courts
must use the Act to redress the most subtle forms of discrimina-
tory advertising because this unprosecuted space is where the
master narrative of black inferiority, in its most subtle form,
does the most permanent damage to black legal personhood °4
and to the Act's goal of integrated housing.0 5
To this extent, the master narrative of black inferiority is
carried upon a current of sublimal messages, which, in whole or
in part, deny blacks recognition of their personhood and respect
for their rights.0 6 This current provides the continued medium
for the use of violence, intimidation, and conspiracy to inhibit
and discourage blacks from entering, and remaining in, all-white
neighborhoods.0 7 This current is the province of sections
3604(c) and 3631 of the Fair Housing Act.
A. Dominant White Images Within the Master Narrative
In the promotion or sale of housing, dominant white images
coexist with the master narrative of black inferiority because
housing segregation does not occur in a vacuum and because
502 U.S. 821 (1991). The Times appealed from a lower court ruling holding that "the
First Amendment provides no protection for such illegal commercial speech, and that
requiring the Times to monitor the ads it receives would not impose an unconstitu-
tional burden on the press." Id. For further discussion of these First Amendment
issues, see Central Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 562-
63 (1980).
203. See RA. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992) (holding that a disorder-
ly conduct ordinance prohibiting the burning of crosses violated the First Amend-
ment because of viewpoint discrimination); see also Note, Federal Prosecution of
Cross Burners, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1729 (1994) (arguing that federal civil rights stat-
utes can constitutionally protect individuals from cross burnings under RA.V.).
204. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 n.11 (1954) (considering
tests by Dr. Kenneth B. Clark on black self-hatred as a consequence of the explicit
and implicit message of post-Plessy race segregation); see also CLARK, supra note 76,
at 27-110 (describing the social dynamics and psychology of the ghetto that contrib-
ute to black self-hatred).
205. See, e.g., South-Suburban Hous. Ctr. v. Greater S. Suburban Bd. of Realtors,
935 F.2d 868, 884-85 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 972 (1992).
206. See, e.g., Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857) (holding that a black
person has no rights that a white person must respect). Although the message in
Dred Scott was hardly sublime, it is, perhaps, the most glaring example of this
phenomenon.
207. Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 3631 (1988) (prohibiting such racially motivated violence).
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symbolic images cannot have meaning in a context outside of a
racist American history and white supremacy. Dominant white
images are an integral part of society's institutional practices,
and the dominant white images in America reinforce at least a
preference for whites only °" and, at most, a theory of white
supremacy.0 9 As a corollary, the master narrative of black
inferiority thus operates not only broadly within society, but also
specifically within the arena of housing segregation. Because of
the congressional role in combatting this segregation, courts
have had little power to eradicate permanently how advertis-
ers abuse and violate the Act's strictures against discriminato-
ry advertisement.21 Advertising is thus one method that
whites have used to perpetuate dominant white images.211
Such images affect blacks subtly,212 and the effect is deep
and permanent."'
The Act recognizes the pervasive impact of dominant white
images, and it contains prohibitive language against these abus-
208. See Margot S. Rubin, Advertising and Title VIHI: The Discriminatory Use of
Models in Real Estate Advertisements, 98 YALE L.J. 165 (1988) (analyzing racial
preference and intent requirements of § 3604(c)); Margaret A. Fiorino, Comment,
Advertising for Apartheid: The Use of All White Models in Marketing Real Estate as
a Violation of the Fair Housing Act, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 1429 (1988) (reviewing court
decisions on racial preference advertising).
209. See Michael E. Rosman, Ambiguity and the First Amendment: Some Thoughts
on All-White Advertising, 61 TENN. L. REV. 289, 292 (1993) (challenging the "pre-
sumption (or, at least, challeng[ing] its standing as a presumption)" that the use of
all-white models sends a discriminatory message and asking "vhat kind of proof
should be required to show that an advertising campaign using primarily white
human models sends a discriminatory message").
210. Smith, supra note 176, at 1521.
211. See DICK HEBDIGE, HIDING IN THE LIGHT: ON IMAGES AND THINGS (1988).
212. See George Gerbner, The Gospel of Instant Gratification in Advertising and the
Corrupting of America, 41 BUS. & Soc'y REV. 64, 68 (1982). Advertisements are
stories we tell about how society works. "They illuminat the hidden relationships
and invisible dynamics of life. Inventing the characters and facts of a narrative
permits the development of a culture's truest conceptions about how things really
work. This is called mythology, fiction, and drama." Id.
213. See Paulette M. Caldwell, A Hair Piece: Perspectives on the Intersection of Race
and Gender, 1991 DUKE L.J. 365 (challenging the legality of employers' prohibitions
against black hairstyles); Margaret E. Montoya, Mascaras, Trenzas, Y Greflas:
Un/Masking the Self While Un/Braiding Latina Stories and Legal Discourse, 17
HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 185 (1994) (examining the phenomenon of "masking" as a
means of subordinating minority groups).
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es.214 Section 3604(c) of the Act provides, in relevant part: "it
shall be unlawful... [t]o make, print, or publish, or cause to be
made, printed, or published any notice, statement, or advertise-
ment, with respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling that indi-
cates any preference, limitation, or discrimination based on
race ... 215
In preventing the integration of neighborhoods, a section
3604(c) violation can be relatively subtle. In promoting their
properties, advertisers will use all-white human models.216 By
using these models, the advertisers express a preference for
white renters or purchasers that encourages a racially exclusive
community.
217
Even though the dominant white images operate subtly to
reinforce the master narrative of black inferiority, advertisers
can theoretically avoid costly litigation despite their use of such
images. In 1980, HUD issued "guidance" to newspapers and
other advertisers.218 HUD stated that "Iselective advertising
may involve an advertising campaign using human models pri-
marily in media that cater to one racial or national origin seg-
ment of the population without a complementary advertising
campaign that is directed at other groups." 19 This language
precluded any use of human models by advertisers who wanted
to discourage responses from certain groups covered by Title
VIII.220 Furthermore, if advertisers used human models, these
214. See Housing Opportunities Made Equal, Inc. (HOME) v. Cincinnati Enquirer,
Inc., 943 F.2d 644, 652 (6th Cir. 1991) ("Congress obviously recognized the key role
housing advertisements play in potential real estate transactions and concluded that
the regulations [sic] of real estate advertisements is warranted.").
215. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (1988).
216. See Ragin v. New York Times Co., 923 F.2d 955, 999 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 81 (1991); Ann Mariano, Developer, Firm Settle Avenal Suit, WASH. POST,
Sept. 9, 1989, at D12 ("Use of only white models in house ads 'really works because
the message is unTistakable that blacks are not wanted.'") (quoting Professor
Girardeau A. Spann, Georgetown University).
217. See Fiorino, supra note 208, at 1433-34 (discussing Saunders v. General Servs.
Corp., 659 F. Supp. 142 (E.D. Va. 1987)); see also Ragin, 923 F.2d at 999-1000 (stat-
ing that "we read the word 'preference' to describe any ad that would discourage an
ordinary reader of a particular race from answering it").
218. See 24 C.F.R §§ 109.5-.30 (1994).
219. 24 C.F.R. § 109.25(c).
220. Id. (emphasis added).
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models were to "be clearly definable as reasonably representing
majority and minority groups in the metropolitan area."22 Un-
der this section, HUD rejected any notion that "models used
should reflect, in numbers, the exact percentage of various cov-
ered groups in the population" because this approach was
"clearly unworkable." In Housing Opportunities Made Equal,
Inc. v. Cincinnati Enquirer, Inc. (HOME), 4 the court conclud-
ed that by using the phrase "reasonably representing," HUD "in-
tended to assure that models will convey a message of general
inclusiveness of persons covered by Title VIII, not literal display
of each minority group."'
HUD's "guidance," however, cannot eradicate an impermissi-
ble racial preference when an advertiser's advertising campaign
has dominant white images. Given HUD's "guidance," dominant
white images still operate to enforce the master narrative of
black inferiority. Except in those instances in which the alleged
violation of section 3604(c) is palpable and discernible to even
the most jaundiced eye," some federal courts have struggled
to find that all-white advertising campaigns violate the Act's
strictures." Some courts require that a general message of
discrimination must be traced to a particular advertisement in
order to violate the Act.
22
221. 24 C.F.R. § 109.30(b) (emphasis added).
222. See Housing Opportunities Made Equal, Inc. (HOME) v. Cincinnati Enquirer,
Inc., 943 F.2d 644, 647 (6th Cir. 1991) (quoting 45 Fed. Reg. 57,105 (1980)).
223. Id.; see 24 C.F.R. § 109.30(b); see also Spann v. Colonial Village, Inc., 662 F.
Supp. 541, 546 (D.D.C. 1987) (holding that § 3604(c) does not require mathematical
proportionality).
224. 943 F.2d 644.
225. Id. at 647 (quoting 45 Fed. Reg. 57,105 (1980)). In 1989, HUD again signifi-
cantly revised fair housing advertising regulation by including families and the hand-
icapped among the Act's protected groups. 54 Fed. Reg. 3232 (1989) (codified at 24
C.F.R. pts. 14, 100, 103-106, 109, 110, 115, 121 (1994)). These new regulations creat-
ed a list of prohibited conduct, that included "[ulsing words, phrases, photographs,
illustrations, symbols or forms which convey that dwellings are available or not
available to a particular group of persons." 54 Fed. Reg. 3232, 3285 (1989).
226. See, e.g., Ragin v. New York Times Co., 923 F.2d 995 (2d Cir. 1991) (affirming
a judgment against the Times for publishing all-white advertisements).
227. See Fenwick-Schafer v. Sterling Homes Corp., 774 F. Supp. 361, 364-66 (D.
Md. 1991) (denying summary judgment motion because the defendants' exclusive use
of white models presented a genuine issue of material fact as to whether such action
suggests a racial preference to an ordinary reader).
228. See, e.g., Housing Opportunities Made Equal, Inc. (HOME) v. Cincinnati En-
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This Article argues differently. If a publisher permits just one
all-white advertisement featuring human models to be pub-
lished, he should be held to violate section 3604(c), even if the
community to which the advertising is directed is predominant-
ly, if not exclusively, white. This position must be adopted be-
cause the world at large is not predominantly white, and such a
dominant white image more than suggests that people of color
who live outside of that community are not welcome.
Even if a court finds that a defendant's advertising campaign
violates section 3604(c), it may not understand how a single
dominant white image works conjunctively with the master
narrative of black inferiority. Consider, for example, the Second
Circuit's decision in Ragin v. New York Times Co. 9 In Ragin,
the court of appeals addressed two issues. First, it considered
whether section 3604(c) prohibits the "use of models as a medi-
um for* the expression of a racial preference" and held that it
did."3 Second, the court reviewed whether, and under what
circumstances, "the use of models may convey an illegal racial
message."' In applying the ordinary reader standard 2 uti-
lized in United States v. Hunter" and Spann v. Colonial Vil-
lage, Inc., 4 the court of appeals held that in those circum-
stances in which advertisers target potential consumer groups
by using models of a particular race, a trier of fact may con-
clude that the ads "will be read by the ordinary reader as indi-
cating a racial preference."' The court in Ragin thus affirmed
the lower court's ruling dismissing the New York Times's
12(b)(6) motion.
quirer, Inc., 943 F.2d 644, 652 (6th Cir. 1991).
229. 923 F.2d 995 (2d Cir. 1991). The plaintiffs were black persons who were look-
ing for housing in a New York metropolitan area and the Open Housing Center, a
not-for-profit New York corporation whose primary goal was to eliminate racially
discriminatory housing practices. Id. at 998.
230. Id. at 1000.
231. Id.
232. The court in Ragin stated that "we read the statute to be violated if an ad
for housing suggests to an ordinary reader that a particular race is preferred or
dispreferred for the housing in question." Id. at 999.
233. 459 F.2d 205, 215 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 934 (1972).
234. 899 F.2d 24 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 980 (1990).
235. Ragin, 923 F.2d at 1000.
119
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The court's analysis in Ragin suggests a heightened aware-
ness of the powerful, albeit subtle, messages conveyed by domi-
nant white imagesY6 The plaintiffs alleged that, even after
Congress enacted the Fair Housing Act, the Times published
real estate advertisements' for property located in "white
buildings, developments, communities or neighborhoods using
thousands of human models, virtually all white."' Even the
Times' ads that depicted blacks cast them as "building mainte-
nance employees, doormen, entertainers, sports figures, small
children or cartoon characters." On those rare occasions
when the Times did portray blacks as consumers, the advertise-
ments were for housing located in predominantly black
neighborhoods. 9 The plaintiffs in Ragin argued that human
models "often represent actual or potential purchasers or rent-
ers, or the type of potential purchasers or renters that the real
estate owner has targeted as desirable occupants," 4 ° and that
advertisements dominated by white models dissuade potential
black applicants.24' Therefore, they asserted that the Times's
ad using human models reflective of the "predominant race of
the advertised building, development or community indicated a
discriminatory racial preference."242 The court agreed.
In affirming the lower court ruling, the court in Ragin con-
cluded that discriminatory message, not discriminatory intent, is
236. See generally Fiorino, supra note 208, at 1434 ("Even the average layman ...
knew that advertisers chose their models carefully in order to encourage their target
market to identify with the model."); Stearns, supra note 123, at 1201 ("The widely
accepted premise driving these multibillion dollar advertising budgets and multime-
dia advertising campaigns is that advertising works-that is, that consumers make
choices about products in response to advertisements.").
237. Ragin, 923 F.2d at 998.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. See Ragin v. Harry Macklowe Real Estate Co., 6 F.3d 898 (2d Cir. 1993) (con-
cluding that the FHA reaches even subtle expressions of racism in advertising);
United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205, 214 (4th Cir.) (stating that "seeing large
numbers of 'white only' advertisements in one part of a city may deter non-whites
from venturing to seek homes there"), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 934 (1972); Stearns,
supra note 123, at 1211-18 (discussing the jurisprudence on real estate advertising
and impermissible racial preferences).
242. Ragin, 923 F.2d at 998.
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the touchstone.243 The Times supported its motion to dismiss
by asserting that a publisher could avoid liability under section
3604(c) if the "ad.., is not facially discriminatory and the pub-
lisher has no other evidence of discriminatory intent."" Ac-
cording to the Times, the ordinary reader would only find a real
estate advertisement facially discriminatory if it depicted "burn-
ing crosses or swastikas." 45 Rejecting the Times's reading of
"preference" under section 3604(c), the court reasoned that while
cross burning or swastikas should not be trivialized, the FHA
does not
[olutlaw only the most provocative and offensive expressions
of racism or statements indicating an outright refusal to sell
or rent to persons of a particular race. Congress used broad
language in Section 3604(c), and there is no cogent reason to
narrow the meaning of that language. Ordinary readers may
reasonably infer a racial message from advertisements that
are more subtle than the hypothetical swastika or burning
cross, and we read the word "preference" to describe any ad
that would discourage an ordinary reader of a particular race
from answering it.246
Judge Winter's majority opinion would also allow a lower
court finding that advertisers use "sophisticated modes of per-
suasion2 to target particular consumers with certain racial
characteristics.248 The Ragin majority thus demonstrated a
heightened sensitivity to the deep places a dominant white im-
age might touch. The court reasoned that "[w]e live in a race-
conscious society; and real estate advertisers seeking the atten-
tion of groups that are largely white may see greater profit in
appealing to white consumers in a manner that consciously or
unconsciously discourages non-whites." '49 The court also noted
that advertisers are either too lazy to take a different approach
to creative marketing or too afraid that black models would
243. Id. at 1000.
244. Id. at 999.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 999-1000.
247. Id. at 1000.
248. Id.
249. Id; see Lawrence, supra note 12, at 361; Oppenheimer, supra note 12, at 911.
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frighten white consumers." However, the court's most telling
language, virtually post-modern in its focus,"' illustrated a
clear understanding of how the master narrative of black inferi-
ority, upon which advertising's dominant white images depend,
works in advertising.
Advertising is a make-up-your-own world in which one builds
an image from scratch, selecting those portrayals that will
attract targeted consumers and discarding those that will put
them off. Locale, setting, actions portrayed, weather, height,
weight, gender, hair color, dress, race, and numerous other
factors are varied as needed to convey the message intend-
ed.... Similarly, a housing complex may decide that the use
of models of one race alone will maximize the number of
potential consumers who respond, even though it may also
250. Ragin, 923 F.2d at 1000. In response to the court's point about the real estate
advertisers' laziness in failing to use black human models, Goldberg would argue
that by not taking the time to use black human models, these real estate advertis-
ers hope to render blacks not only socially invisible, but also economically irrelevant
to the target housing market. See GOLDBERG, supra note 63, at 110. On the issue of
how racist culture makes blacks socially invisible, Goldberg states:
This condition of alienation and anonymity, of what is relation to blacks
Orlando Patterson and others problematically characterize as natal alien-
ation, proceeds by rendering racialized peoples invisible, silent, and name-
less. To render invisible is to silence, and to silence is to erase the pres-
ence of those whose voices are drowned out. What is taken away is self-
representation. Rubbed out is the articulation to oneself, to others like
one, and to the world at large of who one is, of one's history, of a con-
testing set of values. One is denied the power to control one's names,
what one is called or not, what one calls oneself. For example, tradition-
ally names of blacks under anglophone African colonialism and apartheid
often suffer(ed) the indignity of being rechristened, usually by a white
employer or official, with names of weekdays, with 'John', or simply with
'Boy'. These anglicized names are conferred because dominant whites
have been too lazy, unimaginative, or uncaring to learn to pronounce or
simply to ask for the person's given name.
Id. While the foregoing goes on to make other related points, the power of repre-
senting the Other as invisible or irrelevant by not presenting or permitting them to
present their own reality is a powerful feature of federal civil actions in which par-
ties allege that ads violate section 3604(c) of the Fair Housing Act. See Stearns,
supra note 123, at 1200-01 (presenting a narrative of composite facts in which the
fictitious "Pamela" decides not to rent after viewing ads that consistently use single
and childless whites as human models).
251. See HEBDIGE, supra note 211, at 181-207 (defining "post-modernism" as a term
generally difficult to encapsulate and in part a rejection of totalizing concepts key to
the Enlightenment or Western philosophical traditions).
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discourage consumers of other races.2 52
According to Judge Winter, advertisers shape public percep-
tions by contriving a world based on a racially textualized
world. 3 If advertisers socially construct a world in order to
maximize their potential consumers and thus their continuing
profitability, 4 then advertisers who operate within a race-
conscious society will rely on race images, symbols, and charac-
teristics. A race-conscious society racializes every experienceY 5
Despite the court's suggestion that advertisers may lack creativi-
ty due to inertia, the larger point is that all advertisers selec-
tively and actively reinforce our racialized experiences." To
that extent, all advertising suggests a preference for certain
racial groupsY 7 In a country where race-conscious social devel-
opment has always remained an integral part of the way in
which people view their chances in life, the court's reasoning
more than suggests that all-white human models reinforce a
dominant white image, a symbol that underwrites the master
narrative of black inferiority." s
252. Ragin, 923 :F.2d at 1001.
253. See Peter L. Berger, Identity As a Problem in the Sociology of Knowledge, in
THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE 373, 374 (James E. Curtis & John W. Petras eds.,
1970) ("The sociology of knowledge . . .may be understood as the sociological cri-
tique of consciousness, concerning itself with the social construction of reality in
general."); Pierre Schlag, "Le Hors De Texte, C'est Moi" The Politics of Form and the
Domestication of Deconstruction, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 1631 (1990). According to
Schlag, the Derridean expression "Le hors de texte, c'est moi translates to "There is
no outside of the text." Id. at 1631 n.1. Derrida means that "all that is accessible as
knowledge is mediated by the text (and what characteristics, textuality may have)
and/or that whatever can be known as such must have the capacity to be textually
comprehensible." Id.
254. Ragin, 923 F.2d at 1000.
255. See YEHUDI 0. WEBSTER, THE RACIALIZATION OF AMERICA 2 (1992) (stating
that "American society is being tied into painful knots by virtue of legislature, social
scientific and media practices of racially classifying persons").
256. R agin, 923 F.2d at 1000.
257. See id. at 1001 ("In advertising, a conscious racial decision regarding models
thus seems almost inevitable.").
258. With this argument, the court in Ragin rejected the Times's assertion that
through the vigorous application of section 3604(c) to the newspaper industry, "the
specter of racially conscious decisions and of racial quotas in advertising will become
a reality." Id. at 1000.
In advertising, a conscious racial decision regarding models thus seems
almost inevitable. All the statute requires is that in this make-up-your-
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At some point, the court in Ragin turned on itself and re-
vealed that the FHA cannot eliminate forces that judges and
legislators are unable to identify as integral parts of the domi-
nant white images operating in the master narrative of black
inferiority. 9 On the question of liability,26 ° an issue not
properly before the court, Judge Winter agreed with the Times
on two points. First, the Times's liability "may not be based on
an aggregation of advertisements by different advertisers."26'
According to the court, the FHA supports this principle. On the
one hand, if an advertiser engages in a twenty-year pattern of
racially discriminatory campaigns, the advertisements serve as a
key factor in housing segregation in the targeted market, and
section 3604(c) would prohibit advertising that repeatedly and
starkly presents the dominant white image.2  On the other
hand, if an advertiser runs one ad containing all-white models
two or three times, section 3604(c) imposes no liability as a
matter of law.26 It does not matter that a newspaper publishes
several of these short-swing real estate advertisements. The
court thus suggested that the repeated imposition of all-white
human model advertisements causes discriminatory injury. The
own world the creator of an ad not make choices among models that
create a suggestion of a racial preference. The deliberate inclusion of a
black model where necessary to avoid such a message seems to us a far
cry from the alleged practices that are at the core of the debate over
quotas.
Id. at 1001.
259. Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic call this process of identification "empath-
ic fallacy." Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 20, at 1261.
[We can enlarge our sympathies through linguistic means alone. By
exposing ourselves to ennobling narratives, we broaden our experience,
deepen our empathy, and achieve new levels of sensitivity and fellow-
feeling. We can, in short, think, talk, read, and write our way out of
bigotry and narrow-mindedness, out of our limitations of experience
and perspective. . . . [I-1]owever, we can do this only to a very limit-
ed extent.
Id.
260. See Ragin, 923 F.2d at 1001-02.
261. Id.; see also Housing Opportunities Made Equal, Inc. (HOME) v. Cincinnati
Enquirer, Inc., 943 F.2d 644 (6th Cir. 1991) (refusing to follow the Ragin reasoning
on the theory that, under § 3604(c), multiple advertisements by unrelated realtors do
not send a racially discriminatory message to the ordinary reader).
262. Ragin, 923 F.2d at 1002.
263. Id.
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court implied that the master narrative of black inferiority does
not exist without such repeated plays. Liability attaches to the
advertiser who operates in the "make-up-your-own world" and
promotes racism. Although Judge Winter acknowledged the exis-
tence of a race-conscious society, he concluded that the master
narrative of black inferiority does not exist in that same social
context. Rather, only individual perpetrators violate the prohibi-
tion of section 3604(c).
Second, in obiter dictum, the court in Ragin agreed to impose
liability on the Times "only when an ordinary reader would
understand the ad as suggesting a racial preference."64 The
term "ordinary reader" refers tQ the common law's anti-subjec-
tive juggernaut called the "reasonable man." "' As a result, the
complaining party can have neither a suspicious nature nor
heightened sensitivities. Moreover, the complaining party can
not apply a mechanical test to determine whether a given adver-
tisement is racially offensive. Accordingly, if a real estate adver-
tisement used an all-white couple, a complaining party relying
on section 3604(c) would not succeed under the FHA prohibi-
tions. If, however, a real estate advertisement illustrated whites
as consumers and blacks as doormen or custodial employees
played several times' a week for a year, it would facially indicate
a racial preference."' Under the first example, the court would
willingly permit the master narrative of black inferiority to
marginalize and oppress blacks. In the latter example, the court
would invoke known images of stark racial contrast as giving
rise to section 3604(c) liability. Unfortunately, the court in
Ragin conceded the easy case, but established a test that per-
mits short-swing, single-play ads to escape liability.
Under section 3604(c)'s liberal remedial goals, the court's
approach in Ragin is troubling, and it suggests the following
question: why must advertisements not simply slap but brutally
bludgeon blacks? The answer is unclear. Perhaps Judge Winter
assumed that all whites are not racists because they have not
had all of their social experiences racialized. As such, if an objec-
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id.
125
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tive standard yields to a touchy subjective standard, and if one
publication exposes an advertiser to unacceptable tort liability,
then anyone would be able to allege that an advertisement's
racial preference caused injury. 7 If true, the court in Ragin
believed that the newspaper industry would suffer when forced
to monitor all advertisements. This unconstitutionally heavy
burden would "undermine other civil rights laws."2" In addi-
tion to this potential loss of the free press, the newspaper indus-
try would incur financial losses if courts awarded staggering
damages."9 Although these issues were irrelevant to the cen-
tral question raised by the Times's failed motion to dismiss, the
court in Ragin suggested that lower courts can closely monitor
awards for emotional injury. ° This close monitoring and the
need for an objective standard would thus turn implicitly on the
belief that if white racism does not promote a seamless web,
then black plaintiffs must assert that the repeated plays of the
dominant white image caused their impermissible injury."
Without the assumedly pervasive impact of racism or the master
narrative of black inferiority, advertisers can use such images
for a sufficiently compelling business necessity.272
Yet, both factual settings may not only offend the ordinary
267. See id. at 1005 ("The problem is that a claimant may establish a prima facie
case for such damages simply by oral testimony that he or she is a newspaper read-
er of a race different from the models used and was substantially insulted and dis-
tressed by a certain ad.").
268. Id. at 1004.
269. Id. at 1004-05 (stating that "the Times is fearful that such claims from a
multitude of plaintiffs might lead to a large number of staggering, perhaps crushing,
damage awards that might over time impair the press's role in society").
270. Id.
271. See WEBSTER, supra note 255, at 114 ("The black experience turns out to be
composed of many different experiences. Indeed, only the premise that white racism
is a pervasive influence on the lives of all blacks sustains the idea of a black expe-
rience. Abandon this premise and the racial nature of the experiences is dissolved.").
See generally GOLDBERG, supra note 63, at 97-147 (arguing for an analytical model
that recognizes "multiple racisms" and positing that only some racist experiences are
based on domination).
272. See, e.g., Peyton v. Reynolds Assocs., 955 F.2d 247, 252 (4th Cir. 1992) (using
a disparate impact theory under the Fair Housing Act, the tenant plaintiffs "estab-
lished a prima facie case by showing the discriminatory effect of Reynolds' objections
on the voucher holders; thus, the burden of proof shifted to Reynolds to demonstrate
a sufficiently compelling business necessity").
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black reader, but also, in the aggregate, suggest a racial prefer-
ence for white consumers. In part, the court implicitly addressed
this issue. By defining the ordinary reader as the reasonable
man, the court invoked not only a white male presence but also
white male experiences. 2 13 By impliedly limiting the scope of
273. See Robinson, supra note 57 at 117-74 (deconstructing and analyzing Profes-
sors Daniel Farber and Suzanne Sherry's reliance on the customary test for truth);
see also Allan C. Hutchinson, Gender, Difference, and Postmodernism: Inessentially
Speaking (Is There Politics After Postnodernism?), 89 MICH. L. REV. 1549, 1564
(1991).
It is as culpable to ignore difference as it is to dwell on it as an excuse
to take it seriously. The goal is not to locate and give expression to the
authentic voice of African Americans', gays', or women's experience-this
will ensure the continued dominance of white and male voices against
which other voices will always vie for attention and whose importance
will be reinforced at the very moment of their greatest threat.
Id. Furthermore,
[t]here is a saying among Irish poets that the translator is a traitor.
Black scholars work within a tradition and discourse in which the white
male voice is dominant. Much of our work is necessarily translation. We
are either translating the work of our colleagues in the legal establish-
ment for use by our brothers and sisters who seek needed, if temporary,
remedies in that establishment's legal institutions, or we are translating
the life experience of our brothers and sisters in the hope that broader
awareness of that experience will produce new converts to the cause of
liberation. But translation is a treacherous business.
Charles R. Lawrence, I, The Word and the River: Pedagogy as Scholarship as
Struggle, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2231, 2276 (1992); see also Edward L. Rubin, On Be-
yond Truth, A Theory for Evaluating Legal Scholarship, 80 CAL. L. REV. 889, 955
(1992) ("The closest approach to a separate methodology in feminist and critical race
theory lies in the concept of narrative. This technique draws on the observation that
women and minorities have had different life experiences from white males, experi-
ences that centrally involve marginalization and oppression."). In addition,
[a~ny evaluation of the sources, however, must start with a recognition
that the voiceg included were predominantly, if not exclusively, white
male voices. It is crucial, therefore, to resist the temptation to which the
original intentionalists succumb; namely, seeing the peculiar historical
facts of an earlier era as limiting the choices and opportunities of the
present and future.
Barry R. Schaller, Getting the Stories Rights: -Reflections on Narrative Voice in State
Constitutional Interpretation, 26 CONN. L. REV. 671, 682 (1993); see also Jesse B.
Semple, Note, Invisible Man: Black and Male Under Title VIT, 104 HARV. L. REV.
749, 751 (1991) ("reasoning that black men's experience of being male represents a
mere racial variation on the white male experience, courts incorrectly assume that
black men suffer from discrimination only because they are black and not because
they are black men."). Finally,
the notion of human nature underlying that discourse is inadequate.
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racial preferences to the perceptions of a mythical reasonable
white man-a construct developed during a historical period
when blacks did not formally participate in the development of
Western jurisprudence274 -the court in Ragin subtly confessed
two critical understandings. First, if the master narrative of
black inferiority pervades a race-conscious society, and if people
of color can nimbly move between objective and subjective theo-
ries of liability, then such an interpretation of section 3604(c)
would confer an unintended largess and wealth transfer on
blacks. Second, if courts do not view racism, dominant white
images, or the master narrative of black inferiority from a white
male perspectiv6, a society dominated by white images would
come to a halt under the pressure of mounting litigation. In this
way, then, the court in Ragin viewed racism, dominant white
images, or the master narrative of black inferiority as an analog
not to race-centered oppression, but to dulled sensitivities, bad
taste, or poor manners.
As in Ragin, if a court connects a broad reading of section
3604(c) with housing integration, then dominant white images
effectively undermine the Act's goals. This proposition holds
because dominant white images explicitly and implicitly deter-
mine whether blacks are really fully endowed legal per-
sons-citizens with not only standing in a given community but
also recognition to assert claims before that community's proper-
ly constituted legal authority. Unfortunately, except in a few his-
torical instances" in which the interests of blacks and whiteshave converged,276 blacks have not enjoyed this status.
However, my understanding of that inadequacy as tied to the partiality
of the European-American, white, male experiences that inform the dis-
course distinguishes my rights critique from that of Glendon. I find in
the European alternatives that she values the same partiality posing as
objectivity and neutrality, only slightly masked by a rhetoric of sexual
equality.
Marie Ashe, Review Essay: Conversation and Abortion, 82 Nw. U. L. REV. 387, 390
n.20 (1988) (reviewing MARY ANN GLENDON, A REVIEW OF ABORTION AND DIVORCE
IN WESTERN LAW (1987)).
274. See Robinson, supra note 57, at 27-62.
275. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1 (1967); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
276. See Derrick Bell, Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence
Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518 (1980).
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In addition to denying blacks this status, dominant white
images are imbued symbolically with white male voices or
experiences. From the perspective of this voice or experience,
white supremacy no longer exists self-consciously. Accordingly,
because broad systematic racial hostility does not exist, only a
few wayward whites individually discriminate against
blacks. 77 To this extent, blacks do not require broad social
redress. As a consequence, federal law should not mandate
association between blacks and whites. Instead, people should
be free to express their living preferences-a choice that per-
mits housing segregation.
In view of this rationale, housing segregation festers like a
boil, a condition surviving the Act's feeble efforts to lance it and
to find the etiology of race oppression. Unfortunately, the Act
denies the omnipresence of an inoperable story,27 and, with
this denial, courts cannot seriously consider the ordinary black
reader's sensitivities. 79 By denying its presence, the court in
Ragin implicitly rejected any notion that the master narrative of
black inferiority is a seamless web." ° By rejecting how the
master narrative pervades law and society, the court, and thus
the Act, refused to destroy the fount of housing segregation. In
the end, the master narrative of black inferiority not only con-
nects but also intersects with dominant white images, all in the
name of the mythic totem called "white world.""'
277. Cf. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Rising Above Principle, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 153, 159
(1988) (asserting that pervasive discrimination continues, despite Supreme Court
decisions guaranteeing blacks full citizenship under the law).
278. See Lawrence, supra note 12, at 317-18 (discussing cultural victimization
through the continued recycling of Little Black Sambo).
279. See Kushner, supra note 136, at 1104.
280. But see WEBSTER, supra note 255, at 114 (suggesting that white racism might
not form the seamless web that explains black racial experiences).
281. See United States v. Juvenile Male J.H.H., 22 F.3d 821, 829 (8th Cir. 1994)
(providing a government witness's characterization of the "skinhead movement as one
'dedicated wholly to the philosophy of white supremacy, Anti-Semitism and racism'"
and statement that '"when a cross is placed on the private property of another per-
son . .. it communicates to all who see it that the Ku Klux Klan is present and
will engage in the activities that it is notorious for; namely, lynching, murder, as-
sault, and other forms of harassment"); BELKNAP, supra note 42, at 24-25; see also
ELAINE LANDAU, THE WHITE POWER MOVEMENT: AMERICA'S RACIST HATE GROUPS
(1993) (tracing recent developments in the white supremacy movement).
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B. Aggregated Single Play All-White Human Model
Advertisements as Master Narrative
Today,. as in the past, the master narrative of black inferior-
ity orchestrates and perpetuates dominant white images so
that white values and points of view control the socialized
Other's view of the world. This proposition should raise few
objections. Each reader may not understand how dominant
white images suggest an impermissible racial preference that
violates section 3604(c). Questions arise, however, when a
white real estate advertiser only makes a single play in the
advertising market, and in so doing, he uses all-white human
models in an ad running only three times and for just one
week. Indeed, several unrelated advertisers might also have
single plays in the same advertising market and in the same
newspaper. In the aggregate, these advertisements might also
express an impermissible racial preference. The issue becomes
whether these unrelated advertisers should expose a publisher
to section 3604(c) liabilityY2
In the context of the master narrative of black inferiority, this
question becomes vital because those controlling the hegemony
of ideology-information or images-win.' For blacks who
282. See, e.g., Housing Opportunities Made Equal, Inc. (HOME) v. Cincinnati En-
quirer, Inc., 943 F.2d 644 (4th Cir. 1991).
283. See Edward Greer, Antonio Gramsci and "Legal Hegemony", in THE POLITICS
OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE, supra note 60, at 304, 305.
By hegemony Gramsci meant the permeation throughout civil soci-
ety-including a whole range of'structures and activities like trade un-
ions, schools, the churches, and the family-of an entire system of values,
attitudes, beliefs, morality, etc. that is in one way or another supportive
of the established order and the class interests that dominate it .... To
the extent that this prevailing consciousness is internalized by the broad
masses, it becomes part of "common sense"; . ..For hegemony to assert
itself successfully in any society, therefore, it must operate in a dualistic
manner: as a "general conception of life" for the masses, and as a "scho-
lastic programme" or set of principles which is advanced by a sector of
the intellectuals. . . . [Gramsci observed that where] hegemony appeared
as a strong force, it fulfilled a role that guns and tanks could never per-
form. . . . []t encouraged a sense of fatalism and passivity towards
political action; and it justified every type of system-serving sacrifice
and deprivation. In short, hegemony worked in many ways to induce
the oppressed to accept or "consent" to their own exploitation and
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grow up in isolated inner city ghettos, social relationships often
exclude meaningfully substantive, emotionally complex interac-
tions with whites, and, if Massey and Denton have correctly
analyzed their data, the same must be true for whites. Massey
and Denton argue:
Typical inhabitants of one of these ghettos are not only
unlikely to come into contact with whites within the particu-
lar neighborhood where they live; even if they traveled to the
adjacent neighborhood they would still be unlikely to see a
white face; and if they went to the next neighborhood beyond
that, no whites would be there either. People growing up in
such an environment have little direct experience with the
culture, norms, and behaviors of the rest of American society
and few social contacts with members [ofi] other racial groups.
Ironically, within a large, diverse, and highly mobile post-
industrial society such as the United States, blacks living in
the heart of the ghetto are among the most isolated people on
earth."
Although blacks and whites may not have complex social
experiences with each other, they still encounter one another.
The master narrative of black inferiority ensures that these
encounters take place vicariously, through exported images. To
this extent, each group consumes images of the other, but whites
tend to consume images over which blacks have little control. As
such, the images whites consume of blacks more than likely
reflect stereotypes. Similarly, blacks consume images of whites
that reinforce the dominant story. In this dominant story, whites
are central players, while blacks are irrelevant backdrops, if
they appear at all. In either case, both groups consume stereo-
types. For whites, however, the images are enhancing. In this
regard, blacks and whites are ordinary readers. At the very
least, the single play of all-white human models in a real estate
advertising campaign reminds blacks that a real estate world
without a "ghetto tax'  does not welcome them as the
daily misery.
Id.
284. MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 48, at 77.
285. See IVAN LIGHT & EDNA BONACICH, IMMIGRANT ENTREPRENEURS: KOREANS IN
LOS ANGELES 1965-1982 (1988) (analyzing the success of Korean small business
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community's ideal members. If blacks consume single plays by a
variety of unrelated real estate advertisers, dominant white
images might also express an impermissible racial preference. If
in the aggregate, the single play advertisements by unrelated
real estate advertisers over a twenty-year period express a racial
preference, a newspaper should suffer civil liability under sec-
tion 3604(c). Unrelated real estate advertisers can conspire even
while promoting similarly destructive images to the black public.
Any dominant white image, if expressed just once, indicates an
impermissible racial preference and reinvigorates the master
narrative of black inferiority. 6
1. Aggregation Theory of Liability: 7  Dominant White
Images and Unrelated Real Estate Publications
The court in Home Opportunities Made Equal, Inc., v. Cincin-
nati Enquirer, Inc.,M would disagree with this conclusion, and,
in so doing, would probably suggest that unrelated real estate
advertisers should be treated differently than the Ragin defen-
dant and real estate advertisers. 9 According to the court in
HOME, if real estate advertisers are unrelated, they have not
agreed collectively to indicate an impermissible racial prefer-
ence. 290 Yet that court proffered specious reasoning because it
fallaciously assumed that people living in a racist society do not
all consume the same suggestive message about the inherent
owners in Los Angeles).
286. See Bernard Guerin, Behavior Analysis and the Social Construction of
Knowledge, 47 AM. PSYCHOL. 1423, 1424 (1992).
Social representations are socially constructed knowledge formed through
the "give and take" of social life. They go beyond individual attitudes and
beliefs, however, because they are not the province of one person but of
a whole group or community. Any individual could not know the com-
plete social representation .... [No presumption [exists] of a cohesive
social group that shares such social representations.
Id.
287. Housing Opportunities Made Equal, Inc. (HOME) v. Cincinnati Enquirer, Inc.,
943 F.2d 644, 650 n.7 (6th Cir. 1991) ("When discussing this claim, we will refer to
this theory of liability as the 'aggregation theory of liability' and to the message
allegedly created and communicated as the 'aggregate message.'").,
288. 943 F.2d 644.
289. See id. at 653 (rejecting the aggregation theory of liability).
290. See id. at 650.
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value of blacks.29 As the court in HOME acknowledged, how-
ever, unrelated real estate advertisers can produce a general
message." In a country in which the master narrative of black
inferiority remains extant, unrelated real estate advertisers
have not only been indelibly marked by white supremacy, but
also have been, in the aggregate, suggesting the same message:
all-white living communities are perfect ones.
In HOME, the court addressed two questions:293 first,
"whether a single advertisement which features only white mod-
els" violates the Fair Housing Act and, second, "whether the
publication of multiple advertisements by unrelated realtors
which features only white models, when taken in the aggre-
gate,2 4 expresses a racially discriminatory message to the
ordinary reader in violation of section 3604(c).295 In affirming
the lower court's ruling, the court responded negatively to both
questions. 6
In HOME, Housing Opportunities Made Equal, Inc. (HOME),
brought an action against the Cincinnati Enquirer (Enquirer), a
local newspaper.297 The plaintiff contended that the paper had
violated section 3604(c) of the Fair Housing Act, section 1982 of
the Civil Rights Act of 1866,29' and the Thirteenth Amendment
291. Ragin v. New York Times Co., 923 F.2d 995, 1000 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 502
U.S. 821 (1991).
292. See HOME, 943 F.2d at 650.
293. In HOME, the plaintiffs primary purpose was the "elimination of unlawful
racially discriminatory housing practices to all persons seeking housing in the Cin-
cinnati metropolitan area." Id. at 646. This characterization of the plaintiffs goal
was important because HOME had to survive a standing question. Id. (citing Spann
v. Colonial Village, Inc., 899 F.2d 24, 27 (D.C. Cir.) (allowing the plaintiff to demon-
strate injury by showing "purportedly illegal action [that] increases the resources the
group must devote to programs independent of its suit challenging the action"), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 980 (1990)).
294. Id. at 645.
295. Id.
296. Id. at 648, 653.
297. Id. at 645.
298. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 413 (1968) ("We hold that §
1982 bars all racial discrimination, private as well as public, in the sale or rental of
property, and that the statute, thus construed, is a valid exercise of the power of
Congress to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment.") (citation omitted). Section 1982
provides that "[a]ll citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every
State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase,
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to the United States Constitution.299 The lawsuit specifically
alleged that for more than twenty years, the newspaper had
published real estate advertisements that "in almost every in-
stance, pictured only white human models. Less than one per-
cent of the advertisements depicting human models pictured a
black model."3 °° According to HOME, these real estate adver-
tising campaigns violated the Act because the black population
constituted thirty-four percent of the population in the City of
Cincinnati, nineteen percent in Hamilton County, and twelve
percent in the metropolitan area.3"' Basically, HOME relied on
Ragin's reasoning to argue that real estate advertisers violated
section 3604(c) by impliedly stating that these communities did
not welcome blacks.
To advance its position, the plaintiff proffered a far-reaching,
two-pronged assault. First, HOME insisted that the Enquirer's
"publication of any advertisement with all-white models violates
the FHA or at least raises a factual issue of whether such adver-
tisement is discriminatory." 2 Second, HOME alleged that "a
layout of advertisements which depict models virtually all of
whom are white even though independently submitted by vari-
ous real estate organizations or their agents, when taken in the
aggregate, sends a discriminatory message in violation of section
3604(c)." °3 In launching this assault, HOME did not identify a
particular advertisement that may have violated section 3604(c)
and did not specifically name an advertiser who may have vio-
lated the Act. Without a clearly offending advertisement, the
court could not trace a suggested racial preference to its source,
and without a real estate advertiser potentially in violation, the
court could not know whether it had appropriately identified the
lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property." 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1988).
299. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1 (barring slavery and "involuntary servitude,
except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly con-
victed").
300. HOME, 943 F.2d at 645.
301. Id.
302. Id. HOME's first attack contained this alternative pleading because the lower
court had granted the Enquirer's motion to dismiss the case. HOME thus needed to
allege facts which, if proved, would have stated a claim for which relief could be
granted. See id. at 646 (discussing the standard for 12(b)(6) motions).
303. Id.
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perpetrator.
For this court, HOME had reached too far. Under HOME's.
theory, a direct relationship exists between the master narrative
of black inferiority, which operates pervasively and relatively
invisibly, and aggregated dominant white images. Before agree-
ing to this argument, the court in HOME needed clearly identi-
fiable violators; the court required more than a proverbial
"they," who systematically violated section 3604(c). Without
more than pointing broadly at what Yehudi Webster calls blacks'
dependence on a mythic white racism,34 such an institutional
attack would be unwarranted. Furthermore, the court in HOME
was unwilling to sustain a legal theory which, on its face, would
find all dominant white images in real estate advertisements
offensive. After all, the communication medium allows society
to inculcate dominant white images, but a wicked and
sidewinding broadside on that institution would not necessarily
make blacks whole0 5 and would do a great deal to weaken
the power of the free press."' In Ragin, the court made this
very point in dicta.0 7
In response to HOME's first assault, the Sixth Circuit bal-
anced a free press against a radical, far-reaching reading of
section 3604(c).08 For the court, HUD's regulations sought a
304. See WEBSTER, supra note 255, at 114.
An overall racial economic situation is as elusive as the amount of mela-
nin that makes a person white or black. The black experience turns out
to be composed of many different experiences. Indeed, only the premise
that white racism is a pervasive influence on the lives of all blacks sus-
tains the idea of a black experience. Abandon this premise and the racial
nature of experiences is dissolved.
Id.
305. This point is vital because, as the HOME court noted: "A reviewing court
shall grant a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim when it is 'beyond doubt
that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would enti-
tle him to relief." HOME, 943 F.2d at 646. Thus, if relief would not necessarily
make a black plaintiff whole, the court would dismiss the claim.
306. See id. at 647 (concluding that "RED sought to balance between the
'identification of practices which might be viewed as violations of Title VIII and . . .
the limitations which the First Amendment may impose on mandatory restrictions
relating to the publication of advertising'").
307. Ragin v. New York Times Co., 923 F.2d 995, 1003 (2d Cir.) (discussing issues
not on direct appeal from the lower court ruling), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 821 (1991).
308. See HOME, 943 F.2d 646-47 (recognizing that § 3604(c) applies to all publish-
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balance between two crucial interests. First, the regulations
provided courts with a baseline for identifying advertising prac-
tices that probably violated Title VIII.19 Second, they recog-
nized that the First Amendment imposed limits on the power of
governments and courts to restrict the manner in which newspa-
pers publish advertisements. 10 The court resolved the tension
created by section 3604(c) through its interpretation of HUD's
regulations. Accordingly, although real estate advertisements
can indicate an impermissible racial preference of the type at
issue in Ragin, "no fixed and immutable rules [exist] to deter-
mine whether an advertisement is discriminatory."3 11 Without
a bright-line rule, the court looked to Ragin's analysis of the
"ordinary reader" standard.3 2 Although Ragin's analysis of
the single-play advertisement was dicta, the Sixth Circuit cited
it approvingly.
"[The ordinary] reader does not apply a mechanical test to
every use of a model of a particular race. An ad depicting a
single model or couple of one race that is run only two or
three times would se6m, absent some other direct evidence of
an intentional racial message, outside Section 3604(c)'s prohi-
bitions as a matter of law.... It thus seems inevitable that
close questions of liability will involve advertisers that either
use a large number of models and/or advertise repetitively. In
such cases, the advertiser's opportunities to include all
groups are greater, and the message conveyed by the exclu-
sion of a racial group is stronger."13
Relying on Ragin, the court rejected HOME's first argument
because HOME failed to identify a single advertisement that
purportedly violated Title VIII.1 4 The real estate advertisers'
ads contained equal housing opportunity logos indicating that
ing mediums, but allowing for flexibility in that application).
309. Id. at 646.
310. See id. at 647.
311. Id.
312. Id. at 648.
313. Id. (quoting Ragin v. New York Times Co., 923 F.2d 995, 1002 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 502 U.S. 821 (1991) (emphasis added)).
314. Id. at 647 n.2.
136 [Vol. 37:69
1995] FAIR HOUSING AND DOMINANT WHITE IMAGES 137
the properties remained open to all races.315 The advertise-
ments neither used words that expressed a racial preference nor
described the "property's location in a preferential manner."
16
Further, the Enquirer published a notice in which it refused to
accept illegal advertisements. 17 Because the one-time publi-
cation of a real estate advertisement containing all-white human
models does not violate section 3604(c) unless a plaintiff shows
that the advertiser intended to express an impermissible racial
preference, 18 HOME's radical aggregation theory of liability
failed.
2. Aggregation Theory of Liability: Dominant White Images as
General Message
In response to HOME's second claim, the court similarly re-
jected any relationship between legal real estate advertisements
and an aggregated message expressing an impermissible racial
preference.1 9 In the court's view, the Enquirer published legal
advertisements.32 ° HOME protested not the purported legality
of the real estate advertisements, but rather the aggregate mes-
sage that they conveyed to ordinary readers over a twenty-year
period. According to the court, HOME premised its legal theory
of liability on the assumption that "the whole is greater than the
sum of the individual parts."32' By this, the court meant that
even if the individual advertisements were legal, they may have
indicated an illegal racial preference when read in sum. The
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. Id. at 649. The court reasoned that:
Once clarified, HOME's first allegation in its complaint deals only with
individual advertisements, and not with a plurality of advertisements.
HOME's purpose for pointing to the publication of multiple advertise-
ments is to raise its claim of liability based on its "aggregate message"
theory. HOME is not alleging this fact in order to state a claim based on
the repetitive advertising by a single advertiser. We hold that such an
allegation fails to state a cause of action for purposes of section 3604(c).
Id. (citations omitted).
319. Id. at 650.
320. Id.
321. Id.
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court found that under the FHA and HUD's regulation, HOME's
theory had no support, and thus any ruling imposing liability
on the Enquirer could not pass constitutional muster for three
reasons.
3 22
First, the court in HOME concluded that section 3604(c) of the
FHA did not support the plaintiffs theory that the aggregate
messages expressed an impermissible racial preference render-
ing the Enquirer liable.3" According to the court, the relevant
section clearly required that a discriminatory message follow
from an advertisement, and that the advertisement express a
racial preference 4.3 ' The plaintiffs theory, however, identified
neither an advertisement nor a message. Rather, HOME assert-
ed that the impermissible message is "separate from and inci-
dental to the individually placed advertisements."3" The court
concluded that any imposition of liability for legal advertise-
ments that might, in the aggregate, suggest a possibly imper-
missible message required too liberal an interpretation of the
remedial statute. Relying on the .FHA's plain meaning and find-
ing no discriminatory advertisement, the court concluded that
HOME's aggregate message theory fell outside the scope of sec-
tion 3604(c). 26
Second, the court in HOME also rejected the plaintiffs aggre-
gate message theory under HUD's regulation. Under the HUD
regulation, the FHA focused on "advertising campaigns" target-
ing white or black readers for "certain housing or neighbor-
hoods." '327 The Enquirer, however, published both unrelated
and random real estate advertisements that did not qualify as
an "advertising campaign."' Unless they were part of a con-
certed campaign, the advertisements could not, in the particular
case, target either whites or blacks for a certain neighbor-
hood.329 In interpreting the regulations, the court reasoned
322. Id. at 650-53.
323. Id. at 650.
324. Id.
325. Id.
326. Id.
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. Id. at 652.
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that:
In publishing unrelated advertisements, a newspaper is not
directing an advertising campaign, and as an advertising
medium, a newspaper does not limit advertisements to cer-
tain housing or neighborhoods. The regulations contemplate a
certain level of specificity in the discriminatory message vis-
a-vis the real estate in order to establish a violation of the
FHA_ A different message may be conveyed by a brochure or
related advertisements for a property or development which
shows multiple pictures of multiple models, all of them
white.30
Thus, if the regulations do not impose liability, but the aggre-
gate message of different advertisers suggests an impermissible
racial preference, the court in HOME would not stray far from
Ragin."3 ' The FHA and HUD's regulations do not prohibit the
aggregation of unrelated advertisers, but do prohibit the cam-
paigns of individual advertisers from expressing a racial prefer-
ence.2" Thus, the court in HOME would not look to broad so-
cial conditions that could provide the context of the master nar-
rative of black inferiority. In this context, the aggregation of
dominant white images creates just as compelling a claim for
relief under section 3604(c) as an individual real estate
advertiser's use of all-white human models.
Third, the court in HOME refused to impose liability on the
Enquirer based on the plaintiffs aggregate message theory be-
cause such a ruling would have rested on constitutionally sus-
pect grounds. Rejecting HOME's theory, the court took refuge in
the First Amendment." 3 Although the First Amendment pro-
vides less protection for commercial speech than for other types
of expression, 4 the Supreme Court has established a four-
prong test to determine whether a challenged practice deserves
protection.' Under this test, commercial speech receives pro-
330. Id. at 650 (citation omitted).
331. Id. at 651 (citing Ragin v. New York Times Co., 923 F.2d 995, 1002 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 502 U.S. 821 (1991)).
332. Id. at 653.
333. Id. at 651.
334. Id. at 651-52.
335. Id. at 652 (citing Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n,
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tection if it is lawful and not misleading. Under the three re-
maining prongs of the test, the government's interest must be
substantial, the regulation must directly advance that interest,
and the regulation must not be "more extensive than is neces-
sary to serve that interest.""6 According to the court in
HOME, the Enquirer's speech was both legal and truthful, and
the government's interest was substantial. '
After the court had posited these obvious decisions, it paid
close attention to the two remaining prongs of the Central Hud-
son test. Applying the third prong, the court in HOME concluded
that the plaintiffs aggregate theory of liability bore almost no
relationship to the FHA's goals. An interpretation of section
3604(c) that would support plaintiffs theory thus could not pro-
mote the government's interest.' In reaching this conclusion,
the court posited that, under the FHA, Congress sought to end
housing discrimination and to promote housing desegrega-
tion. 9 Toward achieving those goals, Congress promulgated
section 3604(c). If the FHA did not prohibit discriminatory ad-
vertising, "realtors could deter certain classes of potential ten-
ants from seeking housing at a particular location."34 If, how-
ever, the Enquirer published legal real estate advertisements,
the plaintiffs attack would not further the FHA's goals. Indeed,
HOME would hold "a publisher liable for the creation of a gener-
al message of discrimination not traceable to a particular adver-
tisement."341 According to the court, however, section 3604(c)
requires more than a general message reaching the real estate
market and creating an unfriendly environment for blacks.342
At the very least, the publisher must also express an impermissi-
ble racial preference. 43 If so, the issue becomes whether the
challenged adveitising prevented blacks from renting or buying
447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980)).
336. Id. (quoting Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566).
337. Id.
338. Id.
339. Id.
340. Id.
341. Id. (emphasis added).
342. Id.
343. See id. at 653 (stating that publishers remain liable for publishing obviously
discriminatory advertisements and intentional discrimination).
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real property. If the court could not answer this question nega-
tively, HOME would urge the court to impose liability even if
the Enquirer affirmatively complied with the FHA. In the court's
view, however, HOME's theory undermined, rather than promot-
ed, the FHA's goals."'
Addressing the fourth prong of the Central Hudson test, the
court concluded that HOME's aggregate message theory re-
quired a statutory construction of section 3604(c) "too extensive
to serve the state's interest." 5 Under HOME's theory, section
3604(c) required the Enquirer to ensure that, individually and in
the aggregate, real estate advertisements did not express an
impermissible racial preference. The Enquirer would have to
bear the oppressive burden of achieving a properly mixed racial
layout using undefined statistics or standards. In addition, the
Enquirer would have to require real estate advertisers to use
minority human models. If these steps failed, the Enquirer
would have to refuse to publish real estate advertisements with
human models. With paltry analysis, the court concluded that
these steps were extreme and too extensive to serve the FHA's
goal because the free press would be required to enforce govern-
mental policy.346 Such a construction of the Act would still ex-
pose the Enquirer to potential liability.34 ' Because HOME's
statutory construction only nominally promoted the FHA's goals
and significantly impaired the normal function of the press, the
court in HOME held that, without any proof of the Enquirer's in-
tent to discriminate, the plaintiffs aggregate message theory re-
quired a constitutionally infirm ruling.34 Thus, the court con-
cluded that the general message was constitutionally protected
commercial speech.349
344. Id. at 652-53.
345. Id. at 653.
346. Id.
347. Id.
348. See Lawrence, supra note 12, at 322 (stating that "the Court thinks of facially
neutral actions as either intentionally and unconstitutionally or unintentionally and
constitutionally discriminatory").
349. HOME, 943 F.2d at 652-53. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Conflicting Values
in Law, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 1661 (1994) (arguing that different decision modes are
necessary and valuable because they reflect differing values not susceptible to intrin-
sic, instrumental, and commensurable measurement). The court in HOME viewed
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3. General or Aggregate Message as Master Narrative
In HOME, the court's reasoning acknowledged that a general
or aggregate message of dominant white images could intersect
with section 3604(c) violations. If, however, a general or aggre-
gate message of dominant white images does not affirmatively
injure blacks, it has impolitely slapped but not illegally blud-
geoned them. The court in HOME confused racially oppressive
images with a public nuisance. For example, if a general or
aggregate message of dominant white images noxiously pervades
our "perceptual air," a complaining party can demonstrate that a
public nuisance exists. If, however, the complainant fails to show
that she has suffered substantial damage, such as an inability to
rent or buy, then she does not have standing.35 °
To have standing, the plaintiff must suffer not only the vio-
lence of an offending image but also a legally cognizable inju-
ry. 1 Unfortunately, when advertising imposes dominant white
images on the socialized Other, the images do not leave °a visible
stain or create a tell-tale odor in the air.35 Although blacks
may lack a gaping wound, they have no self-affirming images
that recognize their spiritual beingness.353 Without this recog-
nition, a general or aggregate message of dominant white imag-
es increasingly victimizes blacks. Each new generation cannot
depend on the preceding one to fashion the counterstory neces-
free speech as intrinsically and instrumentally valuable, but saw its value as incom-
mensurate. Because race has limited utility and is commensurate, the court in
HOME held that a general or aggregate message did not violate § 3604(c) unless the
plaintiffs demonstrated that the Enquirer intended to discriminate racially.
350. See, e.g., Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970); see also
Ragin v. Harry Macklowe Real Estate Co., 801 F. Supp. 1213, 1228-29 (S.D.N.Y.
1992) (stating that under Title VIII, a party has standing if a "controversy" exists
and an injury has in fact occurred), affd in part and rev'd in part, 6 F.3d 898 (2d
Cir. 1993).
351. Ragin, 801 F. Supp. at 1228-29.
352. See Delgado, supra note 31, at 133.
353. See'Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (discussing the impact of
segregated education on the self images of black students); CLARK, supra note 76, at
133 ("As Haryou gathered data on the schools, it became increasingly clear that the
attitude of the teachers toward their students was emerging as a most important
factor in attempting to understand the massive retardation of these children."); id. at
125-39 (discussing the different attitudes of white and black teachers toward their
urban students).
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sary for its attempts to recast or reinscribe itself. Without legal
standing,- blacks cannot systematically challenge a general or
aggregate message, or expose the extent to which the message
and all section 3604(c) violations promote housing segregation.
Without legal standing, the master narrative of black inferiority
continues to undermine the FHA.
Although it acknowledged that general or aggregate messages
could intersect with section 3604(c) violations, the court in
HOME completely missed the point.. The court protected a pub-
lishing industry that plays a key role in disseminating dominant
white images, suggesting impermissible racial preferences, and
promoting- housing segregation. By permitting publishers to turn
their backs on the degree to which pictures, which speak vol-
umes about whose race is in and whose is out, impact
blacks,' the court implicitly asserted that the free press does
not have a stake in an ism-free society and should play no role
in promoting liberty interests. Therefore, either the press did not
actively participate in representing this general or aggregate
message, or, if it did participate, it did not undermine the
community's collective liberty interest.
The court in HOME implicitly made a critical point: the mas-
ter narrative of black inferiority operates at the level of the
unconscious. However, because the court could not "see" the
injury that dominant white images in the aggregate have done
to blacks, it fashioned no relief. As a historical matter, when
these dominant white images aggregate daily and continuously,
they become part of a yery complex culture pattern. Many people
do not see culture; rather, cultural patterns only take on a pub-
lic persona when given effect. If dominant white images are like
an odorless gas that cumulatively and negatively distorts a black
person's perceptions of self-worth and that gradually and posi-
354. See Carlin Meyer, Sex, Sin, and Women's Liberation: Against Porn-Suppression,
72 TEx. L. REV. 1097 (1994) (arguing that feminist attacks on pornography have the
counterproductive effect of reinforcing "sex as sin" stereotypes and of contributing to
media self-censorship of sexually explicit material that is actually useful to the
women's movement); Note, supra note 16, at 881 (asserting that "to discern stigma
it is necessary to evaluate the conduct at issue to 'determine whether it conveys a
symbolic message to which the culture attaches racial significance'") (quoting Law-
rence, supra note 12, at 351).
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tively inflates a white person's personhood, their effect remains
unknown without sensitivity to aggregate messages and effects
like extant housing segregation.
In HOME, the court had such an opportunity. Had it taken up
the lance and tilted at -the proverbial windmill, it would have
condemned the sacred and the defamed. By broadening section
3604(c), the court would have acknowledged that whites uncon-
sciously act upon the master narrative of black inferiority. The
court would have admitted its inability to measure adequality
the real, permanent harm that occurs when a general or aggre-
gate message of dominant white images becomes part of the
nation's cultural thinking for more than twenty years. By shift-
ing the burden to produce blacks injured by the general or ag-
gregate message to the plaintiff, the court-unconsciously per-
haps-gave a legal imprimatur to the master narrative of black
inferiority little different from the effect of Plessy v.
Ferguson... and Shelley v. Kraemer.356 In HOME, the general
or aggregate message differed little from a Ragin violation: dom-
inant white images represent the master narrative of black
inferiority and play a vital role in the subtle promotion of neigh-
borhood purity.
C. Intersection of Dominant White Images and Violent
Enforcement of Neighborhood Purity as Master Narrative
In any social context, people are a function of what they be-
lieve; an individual cannot be in truth something not considered
and accepted as true. In a nation that has based its institutional
practices on race-conscious social development, the master nar-
rative of black inferiority, not surprisingly, has two vital sub-
sets--dominant white images and violent enforcement of white
supremacist notions. An additional subset of the master narra-
tive of black inferiority consists of those liberal whites who re-
ject open and public displays of violence against blacks, but who
nevertheless consciously act on an unconsciously held belief that
blacks are basically inferior to whites. 57
355. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
356. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
357. See Oppenheimer, supra note 12, at 903 (arguing that "surveys support the
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If the medium is the message,"8 and if that message is
"whites only,"39 be it "sophisticated [or] simple-minded,"36"
truly believing, dyed-in-the-wool racists have no reason not to
act to preserve the "whiteness" and "sanctity" of their
communities.361' The "hidden persuaders" in all-white advertis-
ing. 2 not only assert that Pangloss's best of all possible worlds
is a white one;363 they also suggest that the best white world is
possible only if white residents intimidate blacks who relocate
into white communities or if they physically injure, maim or kill
blacks who ignore the explicit or subtle "No Niggers Allowed"
signs.3
The assertion that advertisers who discriminate in their ad-
vertising campaigns intend to cause violent reactions to incom-
view that overt racism has lost favor socially, but racist attitudes lie close beneath
the surface of our society").
358. See Debra L. Alligood, Comment, When the Medium Becomes the Message: A
Proposal for Principal Media Liability for the Publication of Racially Exclusionary
Real Estate Advertisements, 40 UCLA L. REV. 199, 203 (1992).
359. See Saunders v. General Servs. Corp., 659 F. Supp. 1042, 1060-63 (E.D. Va.
1987) (awarding damages because a landlord's discriminatory refusal to rent caused
the black plaintiffs to feel "unwelcome in [their] own community").
360. See Wheatly Heights Neighborhood Coalition v. Jenna Resales Co., 447 F.
Supp. 838, 841 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
361. See, e.g., United States v. Ramey, 24 F.3d 602 (4th Cir. 1994); United States
v. Montgomery, 23 F.3d 1130 (7th Cir. 1994); United States v. Juvenile Male J.H.H.,
22 F.3d 821 (8th Cir. 1994); United States v. Lee, 6 F.3d 1297 (8th Cir. 1993), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 1576 (1994); United States v. Hayward, 6 F.3d 1241 (7th Cir.
1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1369 (1994); United States v. Garner, No. 92-5069,
1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 1925 (4th Cir. Feb. 4, 1993); United States v. McInnis, 976
F.2d 1226 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v. Lee, 935 F.2d 952 (8th Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 1550 (1994); United States v. Kissinger, Nos. 9-5553, 90-5562,
1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 21200 (4th Cir. Sept. 10, 1991); United States v. Skillman,
922 F.2d 1370 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. dismissed, 502 U.S. 922 (1991); United States v.
Myers, 892 F.2d 642 (7th Cir. 1990); United States v. Salyer, 893 F.2d 113 (6th Cir.
1989); United States v. Gilbert, 884 F.2d 454 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S.
1082 (1990); United States v. White, 861 F.2d 994 (6th Cir. 1988); United States v.
Gilbert, 813 F.2d 1523 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 860 (1987); United States v.
White, 788 F.2d 390 (6th Cir. 1986); United States v. Wood, 780 F.2d 955 (11th Cir.
1986); Munger v. United States, 827 F. Supp. 100 (N.D.N.Y. 1992).
362. See VANCE PACKARD, THE HIDDEN PERSUADERS (1957).
363. See supra note 281 and accompanying text.
364. See, e.g., United States v. Gilbert, 884 F.2d 454, 455 (9th Cir. 1989) ("Gilbert
told a college neivspaper reporter that there were 'seventeen niggers' in Kootena
County, the county in which he resided, and that by the time his group was
through there wouldn't be any."), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1082 (1990).
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ing black residents goes too far.3" However, "advertisers
cho[o]se their models carefully in order to encourage their target
market to identify with the model.""36 By targeting a particular
housing market, the discriminatory advertising campaign
achieves its goals, and "the message [is] just as clear: 'the prod-
uct is not for me.'
367
Because blacks perennially suffer housing discrimination,36
a clear message expressing a racial preference creates two criti-
cal moments. First, the ordinary black reader "hears" Niggers
stay away.369 As a consequence, blacks refuse to live in those
communities.37 ° Second, the ordinary white reader "under-
stands" Niggers don't belong. Whites thus refuse to permit
blacks into those communities.37' Further problems arise if the
ordinary white -reader hates blacks, thinks that blacks are bes-
tial, or becomes committed to violence. After blacks move into
the community, white residents leave for fear that property
values will fall. 2 Moreover, the ordinary white reader refuses
to create a community with those blacks, hopefully expecting
that isolation will drive them away. In addition, the ordinary
white reader violently persecutes blacks.373 Whether the ordi-
nary white reader engages in actual violence, exclusion, or fear
tactics such as isolation, each instance operates structurally and
365. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
366. Fiorino, supra note 208, at 1434 (citation omitted).
367. Id. (citing Saunders v. General Servs. Corp., 659 F. Supp. 1042, 1058 (E.D.
Va. 1987)).
368. See KUSHNER, supra note 5, at 1.
369. See Ruth Marcus, Realty Firm Loses Suit Over Ads with White Models, WASH.
POST, May 14, 1987, at A6.
370. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 48, at 95 ("Given the harassment that his-
torically has followed their entry into white areas, blacks express considerable reluc-
tance at being the first to cross the line."); Peter S. Canellos, Future'Shock Visions
and Challenges for the Next 10 Years, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 12, 1993, (Magazine) at
A34, A35 (describing communication breakdowns in mixed race neighborhoods, in-
cluding black residents' concerns that neighborhood crime watches were really "a
cover for white resistance to sharing space with those of different races and different
cultures").
371. See infra notes 386-421 and accompanying text.
372. Brenda J. Gilchrist & Dan Gillmor, Whites Say They're More Accepting, DETRIOT
NEWS & FREE PRESS, Oct. 10, 1992, at 1A (noting survey results that a majority of
residents of three Detroit suburbs would leave a majority black neighborhood).
373. See infra notes 386-421 and accompanying text.
146 [Vol. 37:69
1995] FAIR HOUSING AND DOMINANT WHITE IMAGES 147
violently against blacks.374 To this extent, dominant white im-
ages intersect not only with unconscious race hatred and fear,
but also with conscious expressions of hate and fear37 --racial
violence. 76 In the end, this intersection depends on the master
narrative of black inferiority.
Whites who believe that the master narrative of black inferi-
ority precludes blacks and whites from living in the same com-
munity generally use violence to achieve the goal of neighbor-
374. See Elizabeth M. Iglesias, Structures of Subordination: Women of Color .at the
Intersection of Title VII and the NLRA. Not!, 28 lARV. C..R.-CL. L. REV. 395, 396
(1993) (discussing law as structural violence). Unfortunately, even though some of
these instances are not actionable under section 3631, such violence ought to have
been envisioned by the FHA, and blacks, at the very least, should have an action
for intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL.,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 12, at 54-55 (5th ed. 1984) ("Mhe
law has been slow to accept the interest in peace of mind as entitled to independent
legal protection .... "). See generally Oppenheimer, supra note 12, at 899 (discuss-
ing negligence in employment discrimination).
375. Psychopathology does not, however, explain hate crimes, racial oppression, or
violently enforced housing segregation. See THOMAS & SILLEN, supra note 12, at 114-
15 (rejecting as reductionist the argument that, because white racism manifests itself
in behavior, language, and attitudes, its roots lie in "instinctual drives, infantile
stages of psychological development, or specific types of personality structure"); id. at
119 ("[Rlacism is both 'a set of beliefs whose structure arises from the deepest levels
of our lives' and 'tie product of the historical unfolding of Western culture."); id. at
120 ("To give primacy to social causes does not mean that the psychological expres-
sions of racism are accidental or superficial. . . . They may profoundly affect an
individual's thinking and behavior. They nevertheless remain essentially the conse-
qiiences, not the causes of racism.").
376. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 48, at 88-96.
Although the level of antiblack violence has declined since the 1920s,
black apprehensions about entering white neighborhoods are by no means
unfounded. Some 213 racial "hate crimes" were reported in Chicago dur-
ing 1990, about half directed at blacks. These crimes included 57 inci-
dents of battery, 18 cases of vandalism, and 28 reports of threats or
racial harassment. As in the past, these incidents occurred mainly along
the color line: of 1,129 hate crimes reported in Chicago during 1985-1990,
half were located in ten community areas undergoing racial change. The
Los Angeles Commission on Human Relations reported 167 racially moti-
vated hate crimes during 1989, representing an increase of 78% over the
prior year. About 60% of the crimes were directed against blacks and
about 70% occurred at the victim's residence. The specific complaints in-
cluded 54 instances of racist graffiti or-literature, 53 assaults, 34 acts of
vandalism, 19 threats, 6 cross-burnings, and one case of arson.
Id. at 90 (citations omitted).
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hood purity.377 Upon encountering violence, blacks who inte-
grate all-white neighborhoods soon discover that they cannot
enjoy rights taken for granted by whites. By using violence, for
example, whites intimidate blacks who later abandon their
homes.378 In order to prevent or punish racist intimidation
and to perfect the Fair Housing Act's goal of integration, Con-
gress enacted section 3631, the "Prevention of Intimida-
tion."37 19 Under section 3631, Congress clearly intended to
protect a black person's "right to occupy a dwelling of one's
choice free from racial pressure.""0 With this choice, blacks
can associate freely with whites and should feel physically safe
within their abode."' To ensure these rights, section 3631
imposes criminal punishment on any person, who, through
force or the threat of force, willfully injures, intimidates or
interferes with a black person "because of his race ... and
because he is . . .occupying ... any dwelling."'382 If convicted
of this federal misdemeanor, violators either go to jail for less
than a year, pay not more than $1,000.00, or both.83 With
this prohibitive regime, the government enforces blacks' rights
to live where they can afford and to associate with whom they
please. Section 3631 thus weakens the violent enforcement of
377. See infra notes 886-421 and accompanying text.
378. See, e.g., Taylor, supra note 32 (describing the racially motivated violence that
forced black families to abandon one Boston neighborhood).
379. The Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1988), originated as part of
Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73 (codified
in scattered portions of the United States Code). The "Prevention of Intimidation"
section was originally incorporated into the Fair Housing Act as § 901, 82 Stat. 89
(1968), and codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 3631 (1988).
380. United States v. Wood, 780 F.2d 955, 961 (11th Cir. 1986).
381. Id.
382. Id. In order to establish a § 3631 violation, the government has to prove:
(1) that the defendant used force or threats of force; (2) that he attempt-
ed to intimidate or interfere with the victim's right to associate in his or
her home with members of another race; (3) that he acted willfully; (4)
that he "acted as [he] did because [the victim] was occupying a dwelling
[in a particular area] and because the [victim] had there associated with
persons of the black race or to prevent them in the future from their
association in that house with persons of the black race"; (5) that the
victim suffered bodily injury as a result of the offense.
Id.
383. United States v. White, 788 F.2d 390, 391 n.1 (6th Cir. 1986).
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neighborhood purity,' an integral part of the master narra-
tive of black inferiority.'
Despite the statutory relief that section 3631 provides ag-
grieved blacks, a difficult and prolonged struggle is necessary to
eradicate housing segregation imposed by the violent enforce-
ment of neighborhood purity." G  Consequently, throughout
384. Section 3631 provides in pertinent part:
Whoever, whether or not acting under color of law, by force or threat of
force willfully injures, intimidates or interferes with, or attempts to in-
jure, intimidate or interfere with-
(a) any person because of his race, color, . . . , and because he is or
has been selling, purchasing, renting, financing, occupying, or contracting
or negotiating for the sale, purchase, rental, financing or occupation of
any dwelling, or applying for or participating in any service, organization,
or facility relating to the business of selling or renting dwellings; or
(b) any person because he is or has been, or in order to intimidate
such person or any other person or any class of persons from -
(1) participating, without discrimination on account of race, col-
or, . . . in any of the activities, services, organizations or facilities de-
scribed in subsection (a) of this section; or
(2) affording another person or class of persons opportunity or
protection so to participate ....
42 U.S.C. § 3631.
Further, § 245(b)(5) of Title I of the 1968 Civil Rights Act states that
any citizen because he is or has been, or in order to intimidate such
citizen or any other citizen from lawfully aiding or encouraging other
persons to participate without discrimination on account of race, col-
or . . . [in such public assistance programs as seeking or enjoying em-
ployment, or partaking of benefits, services, privileges, programs, facilities
or activities provided by the United States] shall be fined not more than
$1,000, or imprisoned not more than one year, or both ....
18 U.S.C. § 245(b)(5) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); see Johnson v. Mississippi, 421 U.S.
213, 224-27 (1975) (stating the origins of § 245); United States v. Johns, 615 F.2d
672, 675-76 (5th Cir.) (holding that shooting into a residence to discourage interra-
cial living and interracial dating violated 42 U.S.C. § 3631, and intimidating NAACP
leaders seeking to find housing and employment opportunities violated 18 U.S.C. §
245(b)(5)), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 829 (1980); Williams v. Tri-County Community Ctr.,
452 F.2d 221, 223 n.3 (5th Cir. 1971) (stating that § 245 is a "criminal statute that
in terms confers no rights").
385. See THOMAS & SILLEN, supra note 12, at 121.
To be sure, prejudice is not automatically and immediately eliminated by
changes in social institutions. This persistence is especially marked in the
case of race prejudice, "in which the traditionally transmitted antipathies
often provide the central core around which there gather other supporting
antipathies constituting together an emotional system difficult to eradi-
cate."
Id.
386. Id. ("It would be the height of naivete to expect that the social changes re-
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America, blacks residing in predominantly white or all-white
neighborhoods live under siege. 7 Consider the case of Mr. and
Mrs. Richard Woods, who are black.' The Woods planned to
build a home in Knoxville, Tennessee, across the street from T.
Lynn White." 9 In January 1982, at the request of Troy L. Cas-
tile, James Brown and T. Lynn White burned down Castile's
house in an effort to collect insurance proceeds.39° Some time
after June 11, 1982, White asked Brown and Castile to help him
with another problem.391 White told Brown and Castile that
"I've got some niggers ... moving in right across the street from
me, and I don't want that to happen."392 According to White's
brother-in-law, "White was concerned about 'niggers' moving into
the neighborhood."393 In response to White's request, Castile
told White: "I think we can handle that for you. Take [Brown]
out there and show him where the house is."394
After locating the Woods' home, Castile and Brown asked
Mack Shelton, a convicted felon, to "remodel" the Woods'
home.395 Before "hiring" Shelton to destroy the Woods' home,
White indicated to the Woods' builders that "they would be
'lucky if it [the Woods' house] stands for two months."'396 On
the night of July 31, 1992, fire and an attendant explosion "to-
tally destroyed" the Woods' home.3 97 After the blaze, White told
one of the builders that "if that black son of a bitch [relbuilt...
across the street from me ... Id burn it down."398 With the
quired to eliminate racism can be achieved without difficult and prolonged struggle.").
387. See, e.g., MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 48, at 91.
In New York City, an Italian American told the sociologist Jonathan
Rieder about the treatment he and his friends gave to Puerto Rican and
black families who invaded their turf: "We got them out of Canarsie. We
ran into the house and kicked the shit out of every one of them."
Id.
388. United States v. White, 788 F.2d 390, 392 (6th Cir. 1986).
389. Id.
390. Id.
391. Id.
392. Id.
393. Id. at 393.
394. Id. at 392.
395. Id.
396. Id. at 393.
397. Id. at 392.
398. Id. at 393.
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testimony of Brown and Shelton, who pled guilty prior to trial,
the Sixth Circuit affirmed White's conviction for violating section
3631.399
Dominant white images and violent enforcement of neighbor-
hood purity come together rather virulently when whites use
threats or acts of violence to prevent a blurring of racial
lines."' The actions of these whites fall into a long line of his-
torically reprehensible conduct,0 1 and this history is often not
lost on the white enforcers." 2
When an interracial couple blurs the racial dividing line be-
tween blacks and whites by owning a home in an all-white com-
munity, the violence reaches a heightened level because the
false dichotomy between superior and inferior breaks down. For
example, on June 3, 1990, at approximately 10:30 P.M., Ralph
Ramey and James "Bo" Payne burned down a mobile home occu-
pied by JoAnn Vance and Alex Nelms."' Vance was white;
Nelms was black."4 Ramey lived near the victims, and Payne's
mother lived across from the mobile home."5 Ramey and
Vance generally disliked blacks, and they particularly hated
Vance and Nelms."' At some point, "Ramey told his own fa-
ther-in-law that somebody should 'burn out' Vance and Nelms
because he did not like the idea of a white woman living with a
black man."0 7 Prior to taking steps to destroy the couple's
home, Payne predicted two things: someone could burn their
home, and someone could get away with the crime.'°s After*a
night of drinking, Ramey, Payne, and a cohort bought gasoline,
and, as they neared the victims' trailer, Ramey boasted that
"they were going 'to burn the niggers out."'' 0 9 Ramey and
399. Id. at 392.
400. See Higginbotham & Kopytoff, supra note 77, at 1970 (describing the intro-
duction of laws in pre-Civil War Virginia designed to prevent mixture of the races).
401. WOODWARD, supra note 18, at 86.
402. FONER, supra note 18, at 188.
403. United States v. Ramey, 24 F.3d 602, 604 (4th Cir. 1994).
404. Id.
405. Id. at 605.
406. Id.
407. Id.
408. Id.
409. Id.
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Payne set the fire with Vance and Nelms at home. ° After a
useless effort to put out the blaze, Vance and Nelms escaped,
and their trailer burned to the ground.4"
In addition to acts of physical violence, whites often use his-
torical symbols to enforce violently their desire for neighborhood
purity. By using a particular symbol of hate and intimidation,
these whites demonstrate a link between dominant white imag-
es, race hatred, and the master narrative of black inferiority.
That historical symbol is cross burning. 12
In Juvenile Male J.H.H.,"1 several young white males, in-
cluding some juveniles, talked about their dissatisfaction with
racial incidents generally and their "disgust[]" with the Joneses,
a black family living in their neighborhood.4 4 In this talk on
racial tensions, the Joneses undoubtedly symbolized lost control
over the whites' security and their neighborhood. The testimony
shows that
J.H.H. told of being accosted by three African-Americans.
R.A.V. related that an African-American male had recently
pulled a knife on him. Arthur Miller testified that the mem-
bers of the group were "really disgusted" about having an
African-American family living across the street from Miller
and they decided to do something about it. J.H.H. suggested
puncturing the tires of the Joneses' car, but Miller said that
had already been done and "it didn't do no good .... They're
410. Id.
411. Id.; see also United States v. Garner, No. 92-5069, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS
1925 (4th Cir. Feb. 4, 1993) (stating that Garner, an ex-member of the Ku Klux
Klan, threatened physical violence and death against a black co-worker who dated a
white woman); United States v. Wood, 780 F.2d 955 (11th Cir. 1986) (describing how
defendants used racially motivated threats against a mother and her children be-
cause the mother dated a black man, beat the mother, called her a "nigger" lover,
asked the daughter if she or her mother or brother had been sleeping with
"niggers," and promised to take the daughter if the mother continued to associate
with the "nigger," and how, in a separate incident, the defendants beat a black
man).
412. See, e.g., United States v. Juvenile Male JHI-I., 22 F.3d 821 (8th Cir. 1994);
United States v. Lee, 6 F.3d 1297 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1550
(1994); United States v. Hayward, 6 F.3d 1241 (7th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S.
Ct. 1369 (1994); United States v. Lee, 935 F.2d 952 (8th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 114
S. Ct. 1550 (1994).
413. 22 F.3d 821.
414. Id. at 823. Russell and Laura Jones lived with their five children. Id. at 823 n.2.
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still there." R.A.V. brought up the movie 'Mississippi Burn-
ig," a movie which portrays Klan violence, cross burnings,
and murders, which gave the group the idea of burning a
cross.
4 15
At that point, Miller encouraged racial violence: "Let's go burn
some niggers." 16 After constructing the cross, placing it in the
Joneses' backyard, and setting it on fire at 2:30 A.M., the men
ran away, and the Joneses awoke to watch in terror as the cross
burned.417
Unfortunately, Juvenile Male J.H.H. typifies the terror that
blacks face when they live in all-white or predominantly white
neighborhoods. Another typical case is United States v. Hay-
ward,41 in which the defendants "burned crosses in front of
the Joneses' house to underscore their dislike of blacks-or as
they referred to them, 'niggers' and 'coons'-being in Keeneyville
and staying with a white family." 19 United States v. Lee420
provides another example. The defendants "burned the cross to
take a stand and... 'maybe that would get rid of some of the
bad blacks that were there, they would take the message seri-
ously and leave."'42'
In each case, whites wished to convey a message of fear, ha-
tred, and violence, and they also did not wish blacks and whites
to coexist in the same neighborhood. With the presence of
blacks, the neighborhood's purity somehow becomes adulterated.
That purity is the mythic symbol conveyed by dominant white
415. Id. at 826-87.
416. Id. at 823.
417. Id. In addition to this cross burning, the defendants constructed and burned
two more crosses on the Joneses' property. On each occasion, the Joneses called the
police. No indication exists whether the police ever actually responded. Id. at 823-24.
After their arrest, Miller pled guilty as an adult to misdemeanor charges for cross
burning. Id. at 823 n.1. RA.V., a juvenile, also pled guilty to a felony for his role in
the cross burning. Id. The court convicted all three juveniles for violating 18 U.S.C.
§ 241 (1988), 42 U.S.C. § 3631 (1988), and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1988). Id. at 823. Each
appealed his conviction, in part'alleging that the convictions under §§ 241 and 3631
could not stand "because the expressive act of cross-burning is protected by the First
Amendment." Id. at 824.
418. 6 F.3d 1241 (7th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1550 (1994).
419. Id. at 1243-44.
420. 935 F.2d 952 (8th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1550 (1994).
421. Id. at 954.
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images, and, with those images consciously and unconsciously
inculcated, the master narrative of black inferiority clearly inter-
sects with dominant white images and violent enforcement of
neighborhood purity. This privileged narrative gives articulated
meaning to white images and purity.
In both Ragin4" and HOME," whites sought fundamental
protection for the master narrative of black inferiority by invok-
ing the First Amendment.424 In Juvenile Male J.H.H.,4"
Lee,"' and Hayward,427 defendants attacked their convictions
on First Amendment grounds by relying on R.AV. v. City of St.
Paul.4" In R.AV., Justice Scalia, writing for the majority,
struck down a local ordinance as facially invalid because it regu-
lated bias-motivated expressive conduct such as cross burn-
ing.429 At a fundamental level, First Amendment jurisprudence
mandates that communicative conduct falls within the First
Amendment's scope,43 and government regulations that ban
speech or expressive conduct based on content are presumptively
invalid.4"' The courts, however, have also established that cer-
tain categories of speech or expressive conduct that threaten or
provoke violence do not receive the same broad constitutional
protections given other types of expression.432 Section 3631
does not punish speech, but does punish conduct that intention-
ally threatens, intimidates, and interferes with blacks' right to
occupy their property." The court in Juvenile Male J.H.H.
concluded that the defendants' expressive conduct-cross burn-
422. Ragin v. Harry Macklowe Real Estate Co., 801 F. Supp. 1213 (S.D.N.Y. 1992),
affd in part and rev'd in part, 6 F.3d 898 (2d Cir. 1993).
423. Housing Opportunities Made Equal, Inc. (HOME) v. Cincinnati Enquirer, Inc.,
943 F.2d 644 (6th Cir. 1991).
424. See id. at 651; Ragin, 801 F. Supp. at 1226-27.
425. United States v. Juvenile Male J.H.H., 22 F.3d 821 (8th Cir. 1994).
426. United States v. Lee, 935 F.2d 952 (8th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
1550 (1994).
427. United States v. Hayward, 6 F.3d 1241 (7th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S.
Ct. 1550 (1994).
428. 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
429. Id. at 2547.
430. Texas" v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989).
431. Id. at 414-15.
432. United States v. Juvenile Male J.H.H., 22 F.3d 821, 825 (8th Cir. 1994).
433. See 42 U.S.C. § 3631 (1988).
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ing-fell outside the ambit of the First Amendment because the
cross burning sought to threaten "some niggers who lived across
the street" and because the young men did not "like niggers, and
they wanted them out of the neighborhood."434
IV. CONCLUSION: A PROPOSAL FOR IMAGE EQUALITY
This Article has argued that the master narrative of black
inferiority explains not only the persistence of racial discrimina-
tion, but also extant housing segregation. As such, if the Fair
Housing Act does not concern itself with both individual conduct
and the broader social milieu that produces that conduct, it has
failed in its legislative mandate to end discrimination and segre-
gation in housing. The FHA will continue to fail to end discrimi-
nation and promote integration. Today, in real terms, the
ghettoization of blacks, their isolation in suburbs, and the
hypersegregation in virtually every major city in the United
States symbolize the FHA's failure.
The legislature must reorient the FHA's focus. The FHA must
not only target racially discriminatory conduct, but also social
conditions. To focus on conduct and social conditions, the FHA
must posit that all whites operate consciously or unconsciously
on the master narrative of black inferiority; this story has been
a most pervasive theme in American race relations.435 This ini-
tial premise is vitally important. The master narrative of black
inferiority not only energizes white flight and housing segrega-
tion, but also rationalizes race hatred and the violence of neigh-
borhood purity. By altering its focus, the FHA's enforcers, both
private and public, can develop steps to identify the manner in
which the privileged story operates, and then, -hopefully, they
can successfully target its effects.
If the FHA has ignored the master narrative of black inferiori-
434. Juvenile Male J.H.H., 22 F.3d at 828.
435. See Taeuber, supra note 7, at 344 ("j1Institutionalized racism and the web of
discrimination are persistent features of American society."); id. at 345 ("My sympa-
thies with the view that deeply institutionalized racism perpetuates residential segre-
gation are apparent in this historical account, where I have emphasized overt dis-
crimination and intentional segregation").
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ty,436 it also has ignored the intersection of dominant white im-
ages and the violence of neighborhood purity.4"' This intersec-
tion remains a crucial aspect of Title VIII's enforcement. Such
enforcement will not occur if courts rely on HUD's regulation for
a very narrow interpretation of section 3604(c). A narrow inter-
pretation eliminates courts' ability to see the conjunctive rela-
tionship of dominant white images, race hatred, and the violence
of neighborhood purity. If this relationship does not enter Title
VIII jurisprudence, very powerful general or aggregate messages
escape legal retribution and official public awareness. Punishing
the violence that follows naturally and directly from the perva-
sive impact of dominant white images ratifies the intersection
between section 3604(c) and section 3631. However, if courts
refuse this route of properly enhanced enforcement, the FHA's
legislative myopia will continue to condemn blacks not only to
housing segregation, but also to race hatred and violence.
Furthermore, without a liberal remedial jurisprudence that
links aggregate white images with the violence of neighborhood
purity, the FHA fails to achieve its goals. At present, courts
remain unwilling to broaden the FHA's prohibitive reach to a
general or aggregate message that impermissibly indicates a
racial preference.4 " Courts misunderstand the ability of a gen-
eral or aggregate message to write a narrative about who is
valued and what symbols matter. These general or aggregate
messages also subtly but violently deny blacks a level and de-
gree of legally cognizable personhood. After hundreds of years of
general or aggregate messages, whites reject blacks as valued
members of the broader community, and blacks who have inter-
nalized that message refuse to participate actively in the making
or re-making of that community.439 When whites reject blacks
subtly, section 3604(c) should come into play. The violent rejec-
tion of blacks by whites triggers section 3631. Unless they still
favor open racial violence, courts must recognize that a general
436. See supra notes 8-15 and accompanying text.
437. See supra notes 400-21 and accompanying text.
438. See, e.g., Housing Opportunities Made Equal, Inc. (HOME) v. Cincinnati En-
quirer, Inc., 943 F.2d 644, 653 (6th Cir. 1991) (rejecting the plaintiffs aggregation
theory of liability).
439. See supra notes 368-75 and accompanying text.
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or aggregate message creates the social milieu that produces the
violence of neighborhood purity. To this extent, the race-oriented
message directly or indirectly causes the race violence.44 Even
if the message is unconscious, it effects concrete, conscious con-
sequences such as housing segregation. By failing to recognize
the intersectionality and causality of unconscious racism, the
FHA fails at the legislative level, and courts compound that
failure in their jurisprudence.
In the context of the master narrative of black inferiority,
Professors Charles Lawrence and Benjamin Oppenheimer have
proffered a theoretical, basis on which the FHA can succeed
legislatively and the courts can creatively and constitutionally
enforce its mandate. 41 To this extent, courts can move beyond
narrow constructions of remedial statutes. Coupling this socio-
psychological approach with a programmatic jurisprudential
response would promote real, institutional responses to extant
housing segregation and provide an understanding of the FHA's
failed integration imperative as well as cope with the far-reach-
ing implications of the master narrative of black inferiority.442
In this regard, Professor John Calmore has argued for spatial
equality under section 3604(b) of the FHA.443 Writing about
spatial equality, Calmore argues:
I believe there is tremendous untapped potential to further
the goal of spatial equality through reliance on Title VIII's
provision making it illegal "[t]o discriminate against any
person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental
of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in
connection therewith, because of race, color, religion, sex,
familial status, or national origin."... On this basis, HUD
should be obligated to equalize the conditions of its HUD
440. See, e.g., Courtland Milloy, Black-on-Black Murders, WASH. POST, Oct. 12,
1989, at J1 ("We've known for years that violence on television promotes violence in
real life, yet we allow black children to have the dubious distinction of watching
more television than any other children in the world."); Don Oldenburg, Primal
Screen Kids: T.V. Violence and Real Life Behavior, WASH. POST, Apr. 7, 1992, at E5.
441. See generally Lawrence, supra note 12 (asserting a theory of unintentional
discrimination); Oppenheimer, supra note 12 (equating racial discrimination with
negligence).
442. See Calmore, supra note 44.
443. Id. at 1514-15.
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inventory so that there is parity between white and black
residents. This is spatial equality.444
Taking Lawrence, Oppenheimer, and Calmore together, a
jurisprudential awareness of unconscious racism and a mandate
for spatial equality holds promise for image equality under sec-
tion 3604(c). Image equality would require HUD to force adver-
tisers to create racial images that reinforce the notion that
America is a multi-racial, multi-cultural, and heterogeneous
living community whenever they use human models. This model
of image equality would mandate that real estate advertisers
take account of any racial group or any protected class under the
FHA. Furthermore, advertisers could not use cost as a barrier to
satisfying this regulation. At the very least, because cyclically
heightened tension and violence have historically characterized
race relations between blacks and whites in America, a real
estate advertisement using human models would have to include
one white and one black model. Moreover, as required by section
3604(c) and HUD's regulations, these advertisements could not
contain facially discriminatory material. If a real estate advertis-
er did not comply with these schematic requirements, courts
would deem the ads discriminatory per se. A plaintiff could
bring a claim against advertisers for even suggesting an imper-
missible racial preference through the human models and the
context of the image. In either case, after the plaintiff made out
-a prima facie case, the advertiser would have the burden of
proof by the preponderance of the evidence. By continuing to
expose real estate advertisers to liability, the image equality
model recognizes that society has consumed the master narra-
tive of black inferiority, and bright-line rules cannot therefore
serve as an adequate benchmark to determine when an image
expresses a racial preference in violation of section 3604(c).
Given Calmore's model, the image equality model recognizes
that the FHA cannot eradicate racial discrimination in housing
consumption by prohibiting only individuals from violating its
legislative strictures. Furthermore, the image equality model
assumes that the current approach used by the courts, HUD,
444. Id.
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and prosecutors to enforce the FHA consciously or unconsciously
overlooks the long-term effect of the socio-historical development
and practices of white supremacy. Between individual violators
and the social conditions created by the master narrative of
black inferiority, those practices underwrite the extant basis not
only of racial discrimination, but also of housing segregation.
,This Article has given attention to two practices. First, it has
focused on violations of section 3604(c)-practices that suggest a
preference for dominant white images. Second, it has argued
that, in real terms, these images provide the practical environ-
ment for violations of section 3631-acts of race hatred that
reinforce a notion of neighborhood purity and exclude blacks
through symbolic or physical violence. Taken together, the prac-
tice and the acts are violent. Unfortunately, while section 3631
reaches the violent acts and section 3604(c) prohibits clear indi-
cations of racial preferences, general or aggregate white images
escape whatever enforcement authority exists under the FHA.
By imposing an image equality model, the FHA acquires re-
newed vigor for several reasons. First, it copes self-consciously
with the master narrative of black inferiority. Second, it recog-
nizes, that the race discrimination that promotes housing dis-
crimination can operate unconsciously. Finally, it accepts that
dominant white images reinscribe on blacks silencing and op-
pressive categories, at once violently imposed and racially op-
pressive. In this way, an image equality model under the Act
copes actively with the master narrative of black inferiority.
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